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1. Introduction 
Three principals define the goals of Information Security: confidentiality, integrity and 
availability. Confidentiality assures that data is only accessible by those persons or processes 
with proper authority. Integrity assures that data cannot be modified and that its authenticity 
is verifiable. Availability assures that users can access data as needed and that external forces 
cannot prevent their access. Only when these three conditions are guaranteed can an 
information system be considered secure. 
The study of computer and network security involves applying the principals of 
Information Security to computer systems and networks. Modern operating systems provide 
a variety of mechanisms to achieve security of individual computers including access 
controls and host-based firewalls. Networks can likewise be protected from external attacks 
by deploying firewall, authentication and encryption systems. 
Unfortunately, development of computer software is prone to human error, introducing 
vulnerabilities into software and making it impossible to guarantee confidentiality, integrity 
and availability in practice. On many occasions, these errors are found in the very systems 
responsible for protecting the computer or network. These factors have led to a proliferation 
of computer viruses, worms and malware, all of which lead to insecure computer and 
network environments. Anti-virus and anti-malware software provide a partial solution to the 
problem by stopping known attacks from affecting computer systems. However, this 
software must be constantly updated and is not deployed on every computer in practice. 
Although human error in software development is an important contributor to 
information security failures, even correct software cannot solve problems caused by 
malicious insiders and incorrectly configured software. A malicious insider is a legitimate 
user that uses his or her privileges to violate security policies making detection difficult. This 
threat, commonly called the insider threat, is difficult to stop as the user may have 
organizational knowledge of security policies. Incorrectly configured software is a difficult 
issue facing computer and network security. A firewall, no matter how advanced, does not 
secure the network if it is not configured in a manner such that it adequately defends the 
resources it is intended to protect. 
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Given the prevalence in software errors, the threat of malicious insiders and the 
possibility of incorrectly configured software, there will always be a need to detect failures in 
security policy. The field of intrusion detection provides techniques and algorithms for 
discovering activity violating the security policy of the computer or network. 
1.1. Intrusion Detection Systems 
Research and development of intrusion detection systems (IDSs) gained interest in the 
early 1990s as the Internet gained in popularity and computers and networks became more 
interconnected. Where in the past home computers and local area networks (LANs) were the 
most common usages of computers and networks, the prevalence of the Internet shifted the 
computing industry towards a highly connected topology. The drawback of this connectivity 
is that home computers and LANs are no longer protected by way of their isolation, and are 
therefore more prone to external threats. For this reason, the need for detection tools 
continues to grow in consumer, business and government markets. 
The Internet era has driven the need for IDSs and numerous research projects, open 
source projects and commercial products exist to fill this need. A common element of IDS 
designs is the use of alerts to notify the user, typically a security analyst, that malicious 
activity has occurred or is in progress. Alerts are typically viewed via a console application 
although mechanisms exist to send email and pager notifications. 
IDS accuracy is measured in terms offalse positive and false negative rates. A false 
positive is an alert generated for an event that is not an intrusion. A false negative is the 
failure of the IDS to detect a legitimate instance of malicious activity. These two factors are 
inversely related. False positives rates decrease as the sensitivity of the IDS is reduced. This 
causes the false negative rate to increase, as the IDS is no longer detecting as many 
intrusions. 
IDSs fall into a number of different categories, or paradigms. A host-based IDS is 
executed locally on the host it is monitoring. A network-based IDS typically monitors a 
network segment by passively monitoring activity on the network. In addition to being 
categorized as host-based or network-based, IDSs can be anomaly detecting, misuse 
detecting, or specification-based systems. Anomaly detectors define a normal profile of 
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acceptable behavior and then generate alerts when activity contrary to the profile is detected. 
Misuse detection systems, also called signature-based systems, describe what constitutes 
malicious activity, typically as a set of attack signatures. If activity is detected that matches 
the signature then an alert is generated. Specification-based systems formally define the 
behavior of a process or application. Any action taken that does not meet the specification is 
considered malicious and results in an alert being generated. 
The advantage of anomaly detection is that it has the ability to detect unknown attacks. 
Misuse detection systems can precisely identify the activity that generated the alert and 
traditionally have low false positive rates. As with anomaly detectors, specification-based 
systems can detect unknown attacks and typically have a lower false positive rate than 
anomaly detectors. Hybrid systems have been designed to combine the strengths of the 
various paradigms, although these systems are not widely deployed in practice. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, only network-based systems are considered, 
although our techniques can easily be applied to host-based systems. 
1.1.1. Practical application 
In production environments, security analysts monitor IDSs to identify malicious 
activities on the network. An IDS instance can generate hundreds or even thousands of alerts 
per day depending on the type of IDS and the sensitivity of its detection algorithm. 
Additionally, organizations typically deploy more than one IDS, be it multiple instances of 
the same system or other types of IDSs. This presents a challenge to the analysts responsible 
for monitoring the network as the alert volume can easily surpass their analysis capabilities. 
Additionally, the volume of information generated by IDSs and network monitoring 
tools presents a challenge in term of storage and access. Large networks can produce 
hundreds of millions of log records per day with storage overhead of gigabytes per day. IDS 
systems typically rely on a periodic archival of older alerts to maintain adequate performance 
of the backend storage system, typically a relational database or a set of flat file logs. This 
limits the analyst's ability to identify long-term trends and ties data availability to system 
resources. 
4 
One possible solution to the problems associated with alert volume is to reduce the 
sensitivity of the IDS such that it generates a low number of events. As stated previously, 
lowering the sensitivity of the IDS will increase the false negative rate. This is unacceptable 
in practice as reducing the IDS's ability to detect attacks makes analysts blind to potential 
attack scenarios. 
Even an IDS with a low alert volume requires additional supportive information for a 
user to accurately determine the validity and severity of an alert. This information, called 
correlated events, comes most frequently in the form of packet data or network flow records 
collected by the IDS or another network monitoring device. Analysts use this information for 
forensics and to determine the scope of the attack. In practice, correlated events are found in 
a variety of different locations including flat files, relational databases and XML documents, 
requiring analysts to manually retrieve information from multiple, heterogeneous datasets. 
The process of gathering this information is called event correlation. 
Managing the volume of alerts and supportive data is a challenge for IDS research and 
is directly addressed by this dissertation. 
1.2. Thesis Statement 
Research in network intrusion detection focuses primarily on small or artificial datasets 
for the design and implementation of IDSs. Tools are developed that perform well on these 
datasets but have failed to extend this performance to large-scale production network 
environments. To overcome this problem, improvements must be made to the foundations of 
intrusion detection systems to provide developers with the tools necessary to build IDSs that 
meet the needs of production networks. 
This dissertation addresses four areas of intrusion detection that are important in the 
future development of IDS: data management and access, alert information quality, alert 
correlation and performance evaluation. For each of these areas, a framework design and 
implementation is presented to address current limitations in the scalability and usability of 
IDS in production environments. 
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1.3. Contributions 
The objective of this dissertation is to provide innovative solutions to the problems 
identified in the thesis statement. The solutions proposed in this document represent four 
primary contributions to the field of intrusion detection. The first contribution is a system 
that allows for scalable capture and retrieval of network traffic data. A domain-specific query 
language is defined to allow information retrieval of heterogeneous datasets via a web 
service. The system is largely dependent on XML and thus can be easily extended to a 
variety of network environments. 
The second contribution is a distributed, agent-based framework for alert verification 
and event correlation that addresses the need for improved quality in IDS alerts. Each IDS 
alert in the system is represented as a feature vector containing information regarding the 
validity of the alert along with correlated events that pertain to the alert. Agents deployed for 
alert verification and event correlation leverage the data management framework web service 
for scalable query capabilities. 
Third, we present a multi-paradigm alert correlation algorithm that correlates alerts using 
feature vectors generated from correlated events. Feature vectors are then compared with a 
distance function and similar alerts are grouped into clusters. This approach is IDS-
independent, as it does not rely on features in the alert schema or expert rules to perform 
correlation, making it ideal for environments running multiple types of IDS. The algorithm 
leverages the event correlation capabilities of the alert verification and event correlation 
framework in conjunction with the data access framework to retrieve correlated events for 
individual IDS alerts. 
Fourth, we present techniques developed for tuning and evaluating the performance of 
alert correlation algorithms, which is applied to support the effectiveness of our multi-
paradigm alert correlation technique. We use a combination of domain expert knowledge and 
performance metrics suitable for large, unlabeled datasets to tune results. Correlation results 
for a sample of alerts are evaluated by the security analysts based on their domain 
knowledge. Furthermore, evaluation criteria are developed to further determine the 
algorithm's performance. While most techniques rely on labeled audit datasets to compute 
the algorithm's classification accuracy, our approach evaluates correlation performance 
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based on any number of user-defined evaluation criteria. We then utilize the evaluation 
criteria to perform threshold and feature selection on unlabeled datasets. 
1.3.1. Data management and access framework 
The first contribution is a flexible, scalable framework for the collection and retrieval 
of network traffic and intrusion detection datasets. Incoming data streams are captured and 
indexed by the framework leveraging distributed computing for scalability. Once captured, 
datasets can be queried using an XML-based query language designed for the domain of 
intrusion detection and network traffic analysis. A single query can gather results from any 
number of heterogeneous sensors, IDS or log files. Furthermore, the system leverages the 
static, time-series nature of the datasets to provide query performance optimizations. Also, a 
web service application programming interface (API) is defined that allows for multi-site 
fusion of information for global-scale intrusion detection. 
By using the web service API, analysts can access datasets outside the scope of their 
network by interacting with other trusted web services. This system changes the scope of the 
security analysts' vantage point in determining the extent of an attack. As network attacks 
become more complex and distributed, this functionality will be necessary for analysts to 
accurately assess the impact of a security incident. 
This framework has been implemented at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to 
provide network security analysts with the ability to query billions of log records from 
multiple sources through a single web application. The system, Distributed Signature and 
Anomaly Real-time Monitoring (DISARM), has been used in production at LANL since 
2002. 
1.3.2. Alert verification and event correlation framework 
The second contribution is an alert evaluation framework for alert verification and 
event correlation. This framework can be used to validate IDS alerts to reduce the false 
positive rate. It is also used to automate the task of event correlation by automatically 
gathering events related to an alert. 
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In this framework, IDS alerts from multiple sensors, and potentially different 
paradigms, are sent to an alert broker. Distributed alert evaluation agents request alerts from 
the broker to perform alert verification and event correlation tasks on the alerts. Alert 
verification agents reply to the broker with a scalar value between -1.0 and 1.0, with negative 
values indicating that an alert is invalid. Positive values indicate that the alert is valid, 
according to the agent. A value of zero indicates an unknown or unprocessed result. These 
values are stored by the alert broker as a feature vector mapped to the IDS alert. The vectors 
can be used to rank and categorize alerts. 
Agents can also be used for the task of event correlation. In this process, data and 
information pertaining to an alert is gathered via the data management framework's web 
service or other data sources such a network knowledgebase or ontology. Correlated events 
are stored as XML in the alert broker and can be used by alert verification agents for 
additional analysis. Correlated events are also useful to analysts. Without correlated events, 
IDS alerts, especially alerts from anomaly detectors, are difficult to analyze. Gathering 
related information through the use of event correlation agents makes this task easier by 
automating the process. 
Agents in the system are autonomous but can be configured with dependencies on 
other agents, allowing agents to be arranged in hierarchies to provide tiered processing of 
IDS alerts. Agents with expensive computation can be configured to evaluate alerts after 
another agent meets specific conditions. This enables complex agents to be incorporated into 
the system without adversely impacting the performance of other agents. 
1.3.3. Multi-paradigm alert correlation 
The third contribution of this dissertation is a multi-paradigm approach to alert 
correlation. While current research in alert correlation relies on features in the alert schema 
or expert rules to perform correlation, our approach builds feature vectors from audit data 
collected using our event correlation agent framework. The correlated events are abstracted 
into feature vectors that represent a network traffic profile, or fingerprint, for the alert. 
Feature vectors are compared using a distance function to establish the similarity of 
alerts. Alerts with similar network traffic profiles will be near one another in the high 
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dimensional space of the feature vector. Alerts within a threshold are placed in clusters, 
reducing the number of individual alerts that need to be analyzed by security analysts or post­
processors. 
Current approaches to alert correlation use fields in the alert schema, expert rules and 
knowledge bases to perform correlation. These factors require normalization of alert 
information, development of expert rules and maintenance of the knowledge base. By 
utilizing correlated events from common network traffic datasets to perform alert correlation, 
our design is IDS independent and does not rely on an alert ontology or network knowledge 
base. This makes our design suitable for production networks because of its flexibility and 
low maintenance requirements. 
1.3.4. Performance evaluation and feature selection 
The fourth contribution of this dissertation is performance evaluation and feature 
selection techniques for evaluation and tuning of alert correlation on large, unlabeled 
datasets. A common problem of adapting IDS research to production environments has been 
a reliance on labeled datasets to assess and tune performance. This is a problem for 
production networks because generating even a small, labeled dataset is an expensive, time-
consuming process that is prone to human error. Furthermore it is impossible to be certain 
that a labeled dataset, no matter how accurate, is representative. 
We use a combination of domain expert analysis and performance metrics to tune the 
results of our multi-paradigm alert correlation results. Cluster entropy and the number of 
clusters were selected as metrics for evaluating our results. We use these factors to select 
thresholds and perform feature selection on real-world IDS alert correlation data. Domain 
experts are leveraged to provide feedback of alert correlation results by evaluating a sample 
of correlated alerts. 
By using a combination of user input and statistical measurements, we provide network 
security analysts and researchers with techniques for building, testing and tuning IDS and 
alert correlation systems in production networks. We feel this contribution provides an 
effective and efficient approach to adopt future and existing IDS research in practice. 
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1.4. Thesis Roadmap 
In chapter 2, the state of current intrusion detection research is described and 
shortcomings and limitations of the various research areas are discussed. Given the 
limitations described in chapter 2, the remaining chapters address many of the fundamental 
limitations of current research, most importantly scalability, the quality of alerts, the number 
of alerts and performance evaluation. 
Chapter 3 describes the web service framework for managing and accessing intrusion 
detection and network security datasets. Chapter 4 uses the data management framework in 
chapter 3 to build a framework for alert verification and event correlation. In chapter 5, the 
multi-paradigm alert correlation technique is described. Chapter 6 describes a feature 
selection algorithm that is designed to optimize alert correlation algorithms in production 
networks. Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation and includes a discussion of future work. 
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2. Related Work 
This chapter reviews the current state of intrusion detection research and discusses the 
challenges and limitations of work in the field. Section 2.1 begins by reviewing research in 
various important aspects of IDS design and implementation. In section 2.2, limitations of 
each area presented in section 2.1 are discussed to provide motivation for the work presented 
in this dissertation. 
2.1. IDS Research 
Research in the area of intrusion detection has been very active over the last fifteen 
years. Early research in the field focused primarily on two types of systems: misuse detection 
systems and anomaly detection systems. This research established the foundation for the 
research that would take place from the late 1990s to the present. Today, research in the area 
focuses on solving the well-documented problems and limitations associated with IDS used 
in practice. 
The focus of our research is on network-based IDSs and the following subsections 
examine several broad areas of past and current research in this area. Section 2.1.1 presents 
research in the area of network monitoring IDS, the class of IDS that is considered in this 
dissertation. Section 2.1.2 describes research in the area of anomaly detection. Sections 2.1.3 
and 2.1.4 discuss research in the area of alert correlation by breaking the topic into two areas: 
alert merging and multi-step alert correlation. Section 2.1.5 discusses applications of data 
mining to IDS research. Lastly, section 2.1.6 describes research related to distributed IDSs. 
2.1.1. Network monitoring IDS 
When deploying IDSs on large networks, sensor management must be considered. 
Host-based solutions are often impractical, as they need to be installed and maintained on 
each host in the network. Therefore, network IDS are widely deployed to monitor large 
networks. Snort is one example of a network IDS, although it can function at the host level as 
well [1]. As a signature-based IDS, Snort inspects packets captured through the network 
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interface card (NIC), which is typically configured to passively, or promiscuously, capture 
packets. Packets are compared against signatures in a database that define what constitutes an 
attack against the network. Any time a packet matches a signature in the database, an alert is 
generated and either stored in a database or a flat file. 
Another example of a network monitoring described by Sekar et al. uses a specification 
language to allow for the detection of low-level network attacks [2], As a protocol verifier, 
the system scales over large networks but is only sensitive to a limited scope of attacks. For 
example, a malformed TCP packet would generate an alert, while a buffer overflow attack at 
the application layer would go unnoticed. This type of system is useful for detecting 
protocol-based attacks and can do so very efficiently due to the specialized nature of the 
system. 
While the work developed by Sekar et al. showed that high-performance network IDS 
could be created, this work only allowed the monitoring of a small subset of attacks, namely 
protocol-based attacks. Kruegel et al. showed that a full-featured, signature-based network 
IDS could be created by segmenting the network data stream and performing full-fledged 
intrusion detection on multiple, autonomous systems [3]. These two approaches show that it 
is possible to monitor high-bandwidth networks without sacrificing detection performance. 
2.1.2. Anomaly detectors 
Anomaly detecting IDS have the useful ability to detect unknown attacks. In the case 
of misuse detection systems, like Snort, there exists a definition of exactly what constitutes 
an attack. Anomaly detectors differ in that they operate by learning the normal behavior of 
the system or network being monitored. Any activity that does not fit this profile is 
considered an anomaly, and thus suspicious. 
The study of anomaly detection involves two primary phases: generation of a normal 
profile and then monitoring for deviations from this profile above some threshold. These 
basic techniques can be applied to a variety of data sets including host audit logs and network 
connection records. Some of the earliest and most important work in this area came out of the 
University of New Mexico in the late 90s. Somayaji, Hofmeyr, Kosoresow and Forrest 
proposed a host-based system using host system call logs that used paradigm of a computer 
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immune system [4, 5]. This approach served as the basis for the anomaly detector stide. The 
principle in stide was that a given host exhibits known and predictable patterns of behavior. 
After a behavioral profile is generated, the system monitors for system call sequences that do 
not fit the pattern. Any unusual sequence of system calls is considered anomalous and results 
in the generation of an alert. A variety of other extended techniques for processing system 
audit logs have been attempted using various techniques including Markov models, estimated 
weighted moving averages, finite automata and state machines [6,7,8,9], 
The techniques discussed above work on log data from hosts and thus do not adapt well 
to a network-based IDS model. To achieve anomaly detection on network feeds, various 
statistical data mining approaches have been proposed. Lane and Brodley used statistical 
clustering techniques to establish a normal pattern of network activities using network 
connection records [10]. Any record that could not be clustered within an established normal 
cluster was considered intrusive. One drawback of this system was the need to pre-configure 
the anomaly detector in a training phase. The NATE anomaly detector overcomes this 
problem by using abnormality thresholds and can function without a training phase [11,12], 
It uses clustering techniques as well, but functions at the packet header level, only allowing 
the detection of protocol-based exploits. 
2.1.3. Alert merging 
For the purposes of this dissertation, we will differentiate between techniques for alert 
merging and multi-step alert correlation, both of which are varieties of alert correlation. We 
consider alert merging techniques to be those that take multiple similar alerts and combine 
them to form a single abstract alert. This contrasts with multi-step alert correlation 
techniques, which correlate alerts through the use of modeling languages or expert rules. The 
commonality in these two techniques is that they combine multiple low-level, or elementary, 
alerts into abstract meta-alerts that are viewed by analysts. 
Alert merging is useful for reducing the number of similar alerts generated by one or 
more IDSs. Consider the following scenario: a host on the Internet is infected with the latest 
worm. It begins scanning the network, attempting to spread. Assume that a signature IDS is 
deployed with a rule to detect the worm in the signature database. Each attempt by the worm 
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to spread into the network from the infected host will generate an alert. If the target network 
is a class B network segment, this could potentially result in 65,536 alerts, one for each IP 
address in the class B range, generated by a single attacking host. Of course in the case of an 
Internet worm, potentially thousands of hosts can attack the network simultaneously, 
generating millions of alerts in a short period of time. 
Alert merging techniques aim to avoid the above scenario by combining multiple 
similar alerts into a single meta-alert. In the given example for instance, the alerts from each 
infected host could be combined into a single alert showing the type of attack and the number 
of occurrences, greatly reducing the number of alerts while still providing enough 
information for an analyst to determine the nature and scope of the attack. 
Cuppens presented some of the most interesting work in this area [13]. This work used 
similarity functions based on expert knowledge to group and then merge related "elementary 
alerts" to create a single "global alert". Three primary dimensions for merging were 
presented: alert classification, time and source/target pairings. With these three dimensions, it 
was shown that alert reduction was effective, although the data set presented was very small, 
consisting of only 87 elementary alerts. 
Alert representation is a related area to alert merging, as it is difficult to merge alerts in 
heterogeneous formats. The IETF has an ongoing effort to develop a standard, XML 
representation of IDS alerts [14]. This effort, the Intrusion Detection Message Exchange 
Format (IDMEF), makes it much easier for IDS systems to exchange alert information, 
although some obstacles still remain. Vendors have been reluctant to adopt the standard and 
there is still a possibility for data representation problems. For example, different IDS may 
label or categorize alerts in a different manner, making data exchange difficult. At this time, 
alert representation remains a problem for the intrusion detection research field. 
2.1.4. Multi-step alert correlation 
The goal of multi-step alert correlation is to combine individual or merged alerts 
instances into the various steps of a complex intrusion. As an example, many attacks start 
with a scan for vulnerable hosts followed by an exploit attempt using the knowledge from the 
scan. These two related attacks are steps in a potentially larger, more complicated attack 
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scenario. By linking these alerts together, alert correlation techniques provide an analyst with 
a deeper understanding of the larger attack scope. 
Correlation techniques typically use expert knowledge to establish how alerts are 
correlated. Valdes and Skinner use a probability matrix to determine how incoming alerts 
should be correlated within the EMERALD system [15]. This technique has shown to be 
effective on the 2000 DARPA Lincoln Labs data set although the accuracy of the probability 
matrix was essential for adequate performance. Another system used the JIGSAW predicate 
language to chain together alerts [16]. This system requires a great deal of domain 
knowledge to be effective. Additionally it leans heavily on network facts such as host 
information to provide effective correlation. A similar work by Cuppens and Miège used a 
similar specification language, LAMBDA, to achieve correlation [17]. 
2.1.5. Data mining 
A great deal of research in intrusion detection has involved the application of data 
mining techniques to the domain of intrusion detection, some of the most interesting research 
by Lee and others can be found in [18] and [19]. Data mining techniques are typically used 
for constructing anomaly detectors as shown in [10], [11] and [12]. The typical life cycle of 
an anomaly detector using data mining consists of four phases: train, test, run and revise. 
First, a data mining algorithm is applied to a set of training data. Training data can be 
labeled or unlabeled. Techniques that use labeled data are called supervised algorithms, while 
those using unlabeled data are called unsupervised algorithms. Obviously, the benefit of 
unsupervised algorithms is that building the training data set is much easier. Labeling each 
record in a data set for supervised techniques can be an extremely cumbersome process, 
however the accuracy of systems using labeled data is typically higher than systems utilizing 
unsupervised techniques. 
The testing phase is used to determine if the resulting model generated by the 
algorithm are accurate. A separate test data set is run through the system and the results are 
evaluated. If the results are acceptable, the system can be brought online to detect intrusions. 
After entering the run phase, the anomaly detector will function as any IDS, sending 
out alerts when malicious activity is detected. The benefit again is that these systems can 
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detect unknown attacks, as they detect deviations from a normal profile generated in the 
training phase. At some point the system's performance is likely to degrade as the normal 
profile of the system shifts over time. The system must be brought offline for evaluation and 
then retrained before being brought back online. 
Techniques exist that are capable of avoiding the training phase altogether, an approach 
known as unsupervised learning, and adapt to change in system behavior over time 
[11,12,20]. Yang et al. show an efficient use of clustering techniques in such a system. 
Skipping the training phase is obviously a powerful feature, although such systems have been 
shown to be less accurate than comparable techniques. 
2.1.6. Distributed IDS 
In large networks it is a common practice to deploy multiple IDS to monitor the 
network. This has led researchers to address techniques for cooperation and collaboration 
between various IDSs. One effort that received considerable attention and funding was the 
Common Intrusion Detection Framework (CIDF) [21]. This research took place in the late 
90s but has since been largely abandoned. The goal of this work was to define protocols for 
heterogeneous IDS to function in a distributed environment. Through this system and 
extension projects [22], the framework allowed IDS to share alerts and data streams in an 
attempt to provide analysts with a better understanding of distributed attacks against the 
network. 
Many efforts exist to implement distributed IDS systems using software agents. The 
Modile Agent Intrusion Detection System is one such system developed by Helmer et al [22]. 
This system inspired the alert verification and alert correlation framework that is presented in 
chapter 4 of this dissertation. Our goal was to utilize a similar, although less complex, agent 
framework that focuses only on the tasks of alert verification and event correlation, which are 
the crucial components of our approach to alert correlation described in chapter 5. 
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2.2. Limitations of Current Research 
The research detailed in the previous section provides solutions to many of the 
problems facing intrusion detection. Merging algorithms and correlation techniques can be 
applied to reduce the number of elementary alerts that an analyst needs to address. Network 
monitoring systems can monitor high bandwidth networks without failure. Anomaly 
detectors can be deployed to detect unknown attacks. However, these ideas all fail in at least 
one of the two areas when implemented in large network environments: data storage and data 
access. Data storage is the task of collecting data items gathered by the IDS. At the most 
basic level this could be packet capture or system logs. Data access is the task of retrieving 
data relevant to the alerts that the IDS generated. For instance, a Snort alert is of little use to a 
security analyst if there is no supporting data stored by the sensor. 
Perhaps most importantly, is the discussion of false positives. IDS research is often 
criticized for the number of false alarms that systems raise. The problem of false positives is 
much worse in large networks with multiple IDSs. If false positive rates cannot be improved 
upon by IDS research and applied in practice, IDS will continue to receive criticism. 
The following subsections address key research areas in intrusion detection and show 
where the failures lie and why they are of importance to the overall security of the network. 
The goal of the following subsections is to motivate the need for the frameworks and 
solutions presented in chapters 3 through 6. 
2.2.1. Network monitoring limitations 
An important concern of any network monitoring IDS is how to handle vast streams of 
incoming data. Packet analysis systems like Snort have little choice but to throw away the 
vast majority of the data stream. Snort can be configured to store the payload of relevant 
packets within the alert records. Even this seemingly small subset can quickly degrade the 
tool's performance and consume valuable disk resources. At a minimum the data that 
triggered the alert must be stored so that analysts can verify the alert. 
Ideally, IDSs attempt to store as much data as possible although this presents many 
challenges to IDS design and implementation. A packet-based monitoring solution can only 
keep a small window of packet data before the storage overhead becomes prohibitive. In 
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large networks, packet data rates are on the order of hundreds of gigabytes per day. It is 
unrealistic to expect to keep more than a few days of data online at any given time. Even 
then, accessing the data in an efficient manner is still very problematic, not to mention the 
hardware costs for such a system. 
To avoid keeping packet data, network connection summaries can be assembled from 
raw packets. This approach has several advantages in terms of data reduction. A session 
assembly algorithm can bring the data set size down from the hundreds of gigabytes of 
packet data to one or two gigabytes of network connection records. This is still a large 
amount of data, but it provides analysts with a cleaner, yet still information-rich, data set. 
Even after applying network connection assembly techniques, data access is still 
problematic. A high-bandwidth network can easily gather one terabyte of connection records 
over the course of a year. Chapter 3 provides solutions for applying data access techniques to 
these types of large datasets. 
False alarms are another problem common to network monitoring IDSs. To minimize 
false positive rates, analysts must continually tune signatures to better match the attack 
patterns. This requires significant time and expert domain knowledge on the part of the 
security analyst. 
There are some cases however, in which no amount of tuning can eliminate false 
positives. Take for example a rule monitoring for a buffer overflow attack on a web server 
that alerts on a sequence of 100 or more null characters. In the case of a buffer overflow, the 
null characters are used to pad the buffer to overflow the stack and inject malicious code. 
Although this seems like a robust rule when tied to a specific port, in this case port 80 for the 
web server, this alert has a tendency to raise an alarm on certain JPEG images that by chance 
contain this sequence. The analyst has no choice but to accept the possibility of false 
positives or remove the rule, leading to false negatives where real instances of the buffer 
overflow go unnoticed. 
2.2.2. Anomaly detector limitations 
As alerting mechanisms, anomaly detection systems (ADSs) raise alarms anytime the 
behavior of the network or host system exhibits unusual behavior. Typically, these alerts 
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report only that something abnormal has occurred for the host or network being monitored. 
This also allows anomaly detectors to detect unknown attacks. While the ability to detect 
unknown attacks and changes in system behavior is an important trait of ADSs, alerting that 
an anomaly occurred is not sufficient to provide an analyst with enough information to react 
to a potential attack. The following sections make similar arguments for the areas of alert 
merging and multi-step alert correlation. The commonality of these cases is that alerts need 
supporting information to be useful to end-users. For anomaly detection, an alert on a 
previously unknown attack would be confusing to the user without supporting data. 
However, with access to the related information that triggered the alert, the user can make an 
informed decision about what was actually occurring in the network or on the host to 
generate the anomalous event. 
To provide this level of access to the data, a supporting infrastructure must exist. The 
previous section argues that data access is a problem for network-based IDS. Similarly, a 
host-based anomaly detector can generate tens of megabytes of system logs per day, 
depending on its configuration. Thus, a large network of 1000 hosts running the same 
anomaly detector would generate system logs in the ten-gigabyte per day range. 
Although false positive reduction is an active area of anomaly detection research, no 
system to date has been shown to function reliably in practice with a low false positive rate 
while maintaining a high detection rate. The nature of these systems indicates that false 
positives will always be an issue. In general, a higher detection rate for the anomaly detector 
will result in a higher false positive rate. Supportive mechanisms must be developed to help 
analysts reliably determine when an alert is a false positive and when something truly 
unusual is taking place. 
2.2.3. Alert merging limitations 
Research in alert merging provides a means of reducing the number of overall alerts to 
be evaluated by security analysts. As with other areas of research, one problem with these 
techniques is that data access is largely ignored. Merging algorithms group together alerts in 
ways that can be difficult for the analyst to understand. In an operational setting, the analyst 
would have to verify that the aggregated alert was properly grouping alerts together before 
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acting on a particular incident. In some cases this would require more than simply breaking 
apart the alert and looking at each elementary alert; the actual data would need to be 
analyzed. 
There are two possible solutions to this problem. The first and most apparent would be 
to store the corresponding data with the alert. Snort does this by saving the offending packet, 
when applicable, at the user's discretion. This is an expensive procedure and causes a data 
explosion problem in the alert database. The problem with this method is evident in the case 
of anomaly detectors. Consider the alert "system A attempted connections to 1000 hosts in 
15 minutes". This alert would be indicative of scan activity, which is considered malicious 
behavior in most cases. However, when it is time to store the alert it is unclear exactly what 
data to store along with the alert. Clearly, storing 1000 data items, the connection attempts, 
would be the most useful information, however, the storage costs would quickly become 
prohibitive, given the frequency of scan activity in the Internet. 
The second approach would be to store all the logs separately from the alert and allow 
for a mechanism to retrieve those logs that correspond to the alert. This is a more scalable 
solution, as the alert database will not suffer from data explosion. Certainly, the cost of 
storing large volumes of log data will be very high. One goal of this dissertation is to argue 
for the importance of storing and allowing fast access to large volumes of log data with 
minimal overhead. Providing analysts with a deeper understanding of why an alert was 
triggered is the first of many justifications for the storage of log data. 
Although these techniques help to reduce the overall number of alerts that an analyst 
must evaluate, they do nothing to address the number of false positives. If a meta-alert 
contains 1000 elementary alerts and 99% of them are false positives then little is gained by 
merging the alerts, as the analyst still must evaluate each alert to determine whether it is valid 
or a false positive. 
Alert merging solutions rely on a normalization phase prior to correlation in which 
alerts from heterogeneous sensors are converted into a uniform alert schema. Often this 
schema is used to correlate alerts by merging alerts on fields in the schema, limiting these 
approaches to systems that can be normalized. 
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2.2.4. Alert correlation limitations 
In alert correlation, a number of alerts represent steps in a single, multi-step attack, 
sometimes called a "meta" or "global" alert. This differs from a merged alert, which contains 
multiple occurrences of the same, or similar, activity. It is also worth noting that correlated 
alerts could be placed in clusters, as they should act like just another alert in the IDS. 
Although somewhat different, correlated alerts suffer from the same problem inherent in alert 
merging. The data items that triggered each sub-alert must be accessible or the analyst will 
not be able to verify the correctness of the meta-alert. Even if the correctness of the meta-
alert can be verified, it can still be difficult to understand the meaning of the alert as multi-
step attacks can be confusing, even for the most experienced analyst. 
Furthermore, the techniques described in section 2.1.4 all require a great deal of 
domain knowledge to be effective. In many cases this knowledge is not readily available, at 
least to the degree required by these systems to be useful. Also this domain knowledge must 
be translated into either a probability matrix or a specification language (e.g. LAMBDA or 
JIGSAW) [15,16,17], This is a non-trivial problem and requires a great deal of interaction 
and maintenance on the part of security analysts. Failure to maintain the knowledge base will 
results in uncorrelated or miscorrelated alerts, resulting in more work for the analyst in the 
long run. 
Lastly, all the systems discussed here are bound by time constraints. A knowledgeable 
attacker will take advantage of such systems by moving slowly enough as to slip outside of 
the time bounds. As these hackers are the most dangerous due to their patience, these systems 
can provide a false sense of security by not correlating events outside of the time bounds. In 
chapter 5 we present an alert correlation approach that does not temporally bind the 
correlation process. 
It is apparent that the validity of elementary alerts that make up the steps in a multi-
step alert is crucial to the overall accuracy of these systems. The attack sequence is only of 
interest to an analyst if all the alerts in the sequence can be shown to be accurate. A few false 
alarms in the chain of events could make a seemingly important global alert useless. Chapter 
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4 addresses this limitation by describing an agent-based framework with alert verification 
capabilities. 
2.2.5. Data mining limitations 
As described in section 2.1.5, there is considerable interest in intrusion detection-
related data mining research. Research in the area of data mining, as related to intrusion 
detection, typically focuses on applying data mining algorithms from other disciplines to 
solve problems inherent to IDS. There is often little discussion of implementation, as is the 
case in [18], making it difficult for software developers to build these systems in practice. 
Most notably overlooked is the cleaning, or normalization, phase of data mining. This 
is typically the step that follows data collection in the data mining process. Most intrusion 
detection experts are not data mining experts. The typical analyst lacks the expertise required 
to clean and prepare data for this phase. If an infrastructure exists in which analysts can 
automate the critical phases of collection, cleaning and preparation, the implementation of 
data mining techniques becomes feasible for intrusion detection experts. Our work described 
in chapters 3 and 4 directly addresses this issue. 
Almost all anomaly detection research involves tuning the system to maximize the 
detection rate while minimizing the false positive rate. Most of this tuning takes place using 
the DARPA Lincoln Labs data set, which is labeled [24]. This makes it easy for researchers 
to find the optimal settling for the algorithms used to detect intrusions. In practice however 
this is a non-trivial problem as it is impossible to perform this type of tuning on a live 
network where the nature of the activity is not labeled. 
2.2.6. Distributed IDS limitations 
Attempts at providing collaboration between IDS have run into problems due to the 
additional complexity required for effective collaboration. Complex protocols and 
information exchange difficulties have diminished efforts in this area. The only current topic 
of interest in the area is the IDMEF specification. By representing alerts in a common data 
format, heterogeneous IDS sensors can interpret alerts without the overhead of data exchange 
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protocols. Even so, discrepancies exist in alert representation even when using the IDMEF. 
Naming and categorization of alerts amongst different IDS is a common problem that is not 
easily solved. 
The most extensive attempt at a framework for cooperative IDS was the CIDF project. 
Due to the rigid protocols and requirements of systems interoperating with each other, the 
IDS vendor community never adopted the project. The lesson learned from the CIDF is that a 
more flexible architecture needs to be developed before cooperative, distributed IDS systems 
can be widely implemented. Such a framework is described in this dissertation, both in terms 
of alert and data management, and addresses the issues that caused the failure of the CIDF. 
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3. Web Services for Network Security Datasets 
This chapter describes a web service framework for multi-site data sharing of 
heterogeneous network security datasets, a basic building block for large-scale distributed 
intrusion detection. The concepts and results presented in the remaining chapters rely on this 
framework for data access to large heterogeneous datasets, making it the foundation of this 
dissertation. 
An interface is defined that allows single query access to multiple data sources 
including network logs and intrusion detection system alerts. Queries are submitted as 
extensible markup language (XML) documents and results are returned as XML documents 
via a single web service operation. A prototype system is deployed at Los Alamos National 
Laboratory (LANL) and is used extensively for network security operations on multi-terabyte 
datasets including intrusion detection, event correlation and network forensics. 
3.1. Introduction 
Access to network security data is critical to the tasks performed by network security 
analysts in protecting their networks. Law enforcement officials also require access to this 
data when performing investigations for cyber crimes. Additionally, access to network 
security data is essential to homeland security initiatives and critical infrastructure protection. 
The trend towards complex distributed attacks on computer networks makes this task 
difficult, forcing cooperation amongst sites to determine the larger attack scope. It is no 
longer sufficient to simply monitor one network segment. Relevant data must be obtained 
from distributed sensors both internal and external to the target network. We address the 
problems inherent in multi-sensor data fusion [25] by defining a framework that utilizes web 
services to allow for real-time, multi-site data fusion for network traffic and intrusion 
detection datasets. The system also provides mechanisms for scalable management of large 
datasets common to network security operations. 
The design of this framework was driven by the requirements of security analysts and 
the nature of the types of data used in their daily operations. When performing an 
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investigation of a possible intrusion, analysts need a means to quickly access related records 
from multiple data sources. In many cases this is not easily done as data can reside on 
multiple database servers, often of differing types, and in many cases flat file logs. This type 
of data is usually very low level, unorganized and can be large - on the order of a terabyte or 
more. Additionally, there is no common format for network security data although typically 
there is commonality amongst datasets (e.g. IP addresses, timestamps and ports). 
Some efforts, most notably the intrusion detection message exchange format (IDMEF) 
[14] and common intrusion detection framework (CIDF) [21, 26], have attempted to unify 
data sources in a common representation, however these efforts have not been widely 
adopted by the security developer community. In the case of the IDMEF, it is a developing 
standard under the Internet Engineering Task Force (IEFT). As the IEFT gets closer to 
completing the specification, more tools will hopefully adopt the standard. Currently, a 
library exists for the popular intrusion detection system Snort that allows alerts to be 
outputted as IDMEF messages. The CIDF's goal was to enable interoperability amongst 
intrusion detection systems. Unfortunately, this effort is no longer under development and 
has never been adopted by the industry. 
Given the needs of analysts and the heterogeneous nature of the datasets involved, a 
web service using extensible markup language (XML) to represent query requests and results 
was developed. The service accepts queries represented as XML documents and returns 
results to the client in the form of an XML document. All communications are made via 
Hyper-text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) allowing the system to be easily deployed across 
multiple sites and secured using the site's existing firewall and Secure Socket Layer (SSL) 
infrastructure. Furthermore, each site designs and implements its own result schema by 
extending a generic document type definition, an important aspect as sites are unlikely to 
have the same set of tools and sensors for intrusion detection and network monitoring. 
There are three contributions in this chapter. First, we define the basic network security 
web service API, which can be further extended to meet the needs of the site deploying the 
service. Second, we define a declarative XML-based query language and its accompanying 
result XML schema used by the web service for returning results as XML documents. 
Finally, we describe and evaluate the prototype design and implementation, named 
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Distributed Signature and Anomaly Real-time Monitoring (DiSARM), deployed at LANL. 
DiSARM provides security analysts with single query access to multiple network security-
related datasets that comprise multiple terabytes of online data. 
The work described in this chapter describes a design and implementation of our 
prototype system that shares many characteristics of a database mediator [27], using an XML 
query language as the common view across the various data sources. Mediation systems are 
differentiated from data warehouses in the database research community in that they do not 
store any data. Instead, data is stored in already existing storage, such as relational database 
servers. The data is then pulled from these sources when a query is submitted to the mediator, 
in this case the web service. Our system differs from traditional mediator systems in that our 
prototype captures and provides access to multi-terabyte network security datasets in real­
time, in addition to providing access to data already stored in relation databases and 
documents. As it stores data in some instances, the system can be viewed as a hybrid 
mediator and data warehouse system. 
Applying the web service concept to network security and intrusion detection provides 
analysts a new means of gaining perspective for network defense. Sites can utilize this 
framework to cooperate by sharing information to detect complex distributed attacks. By 
deploying a web service instance, sites can help the larger homeland security initiative by 
making their logs available to law enforcement officers or other government agencies. The 
need for this service will become more important if legislation similar to the U.K.'s Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act are adopted in other parts of the world [28]. 
3.2. Web Service Overview 
At the core of any distributed computing system is the messaging framework. Remote 
procedure calls (RFC) and remote method invocation (RMI) are such examples, enabling 
hosts to invoke function and procedure calls on remote servers [29, 30]. Web services can be 
seen as an updated version of RPC built on a foundation of XML-encoded messaging. 
Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) is a popular protocol for the message passing 
capabilities of a web service. Web service description language (WSDL) is a specification for 
publishing a web service so that applications can write client applications to utilize the 
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service. Universal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI) is a specification for 
deploying a web service so that client applications can find and utilize the web service [31]. 
The extensibility of XML is a key component in web services, making it much easier 
to add features than traditional means like RPC. For example, adding a parameter to a 
function call in RPC would require both the client and server to recompile their applications. 
By using web services the feature is simply published by the web service host using WSDL. 
The client can immediately make use of this new parameter through the SOAP protocol by 
including the information in the SOAP XML message. This is especially important in the 
Internet, where potentially millions of clients could be using a dynamic service. 
The concept of web services has seen considerable interest in various industries 
including banking, stock markets and media. An example of web services is the API 
provided by Google that allows developers to write software that can submit searches to the 
Google search engine and receive results as structured data [32]. Using the web service, 
software can be written to integrate Google search capabilities in ways that would not be 
possible without a means of gathering search results as structured data. 
Given the pervasiveness of relational databases as a storage medium, it must be 
discussed why an XML web service approach to multi site data sharing is superior to simply 
using an Open DataBase Connectivity (ODBC), or Jave DataBase Connectivity (JDBC), 
infrastructure for sharing sensitive network security data sources. The approach described 
herein provides a uniform language and consistent mechanism for querying and retrieving 
data using XML and HTTP. Even if we assume that data resides in relational databases, there 
are SQL syntax and implementation differences amongst database implementations. We may 
not be able to assume that the supported syntax will be the same across different servers. For 
example, the MySQL timestamp "2005-7-4 12:00:00" is represented in Oracle as "4-JUL-
2005 12:00:00 PM". Although ODBC and JDBC provide some abstraction to alleviate these 
problems, users will at some point write ad-hoc queries and need to be prepared for the 
various syntax differences between systems. 
While syntax issues amongst servers is a big problem to overcome, querying multiple 
data sources is cumbersome and difficult to automate if data resides on multiple database 
servers of differing types. This also becomes a security issue when sharing data across 
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multiple sites. The default ports for Microsoft SQLServer, Oracle, MySQL and PostgreSQL 
are commonly scanned ports on the Internet due to the numerous vulnerabilities associated 
with each product. Exposing database servers to the Internet is a risky approach to sharing 
network security data between sites. Using a web service framework alleviates many of these 
problems by functioning over HTTP and utilizing SSL and firewall rules to safely share data 
between sites. 
Authentication and access controls are fundamental aspects of the web service 
framework described in this chapter. All widely used commercial and open source database 
servers implement user authentication in some manner. However, as each server implements 
these features differently, it is difficult, if not impossible, to provide uniform protection to 
datasets stored in different servers. This becomes both a management and security risk in 
setting up such a system. In our current design and implementation, users gain the benefits of 
single-sign on via the web service while at the same time allowing for mandatory access 
controls on a per-record level of granularity. 
3.3. Network Security Web Services 
The web service infrastructure relies on two XML schémas, query and result, to 
provide the abstraction necessary to enable multi-site sharing of network security data. The 
query schema allows for users to perform a single operation to request data from multiple 
heterogeneous data sources. Since the language is specific to the domain of network security, 
analysts can write queries leveraging their expertise, without knowledge of the underlying 
data formats and storage architectures. This is critical for sharing data amongst sites, as it is 
unlikely that remote users will have knowledge of the data available at a given site. Sub 
section 3.3.3 details the query document schema, which is presented as a document type 
definition (DTD) in appendix A. 
As the server composes the results for a query, they are returned to the client in an 
XML format published by each site. A base result schema is described in section 3.4 and 
presented as a DTD in appendix B but is presented as a general schema, allowing for sites to 
extend the result schema to fit the needs of the organization. This is important in that no two 
sites are likely to have exactly the same datasets or result formats available for intrusion 
28 
detection tasks and therefore will design differing result schémas. The web service interface 
provides a mechanism for querying the result DTD from the server, allowing the client to 
validate and process the result stream. 
The server hosting the web service is responsible for parsing the XML query, 
retrieving results from the various datasets and converting them into XML if needed. Most 
sites store data in a variety of formats including flat file logs, relational databases and, more 
recently, XML documents. A dedicated query processor parses the query and searches the 
various data formats for matching records. As results are returned to the web service data is 
converted into an XML document in accordance to the site's schema and returned to the 
client. The abstraction provided by the server is crucial in sharing network security 
information, allowing analysts to query data without knowledge of how, where, or in what 
format data is stored. 
3.3.1. Web service functions 
The web services mechanisms needed to implement a multi-site network security 
infrastructure are straightforward, consisting primarily of query-response behavior between 
client and server. To execute a query, the client sends an HTTP POST request to the server 
over containing the query represented as an XML document. The server replies with an XML 
document that can be downloaded by the client or processed as a stream. The response is an 
XML document containing either an error message or the results of the query. Additionally, 
the server provides functions that provide metadata information to clients. Clients can request 
the data sources available to query, the query language DTD supported by the server and the 
result format DTD so that the client can validate the result stream. 
Due to the limited set of functionality provided by the server in our prototype 
implementation, the HTTP protocol was sufficient for implementing the web service 
infrastructure. A web service protocol such as SOAP could have been chosen instead of 
HTTP although the added complexity in developing our prototype outweighed the benefits of 
such a protocol. Additionally, HTTP infrastructure is well understood by developers and can 
be easily secured by using SSL and firewalls. 
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The set of actions supported by the web service are implemented as HTTP parameters. 
Each HTTP request must provide an action parameter with one of three values: schema, 
types or query. The schema action returns the query DTD or the result DTD as specified by 
the additional type parameter, which contains the value query or result. The types action 
returns an XML document that defines the data sources that are made available for querying 
through the web service. Also included the document is information about the search criteria 
and field representations available for each data. Sections 3.3.3 and 3.4 explain how this 
information is structured and used to generate queries. The query action is used to submit 
queries to the web service and receive a result set as an XML document. When specifying the 
query action, the query parameter must be set, containing the XML query to execute. 
3.3.2. Query language 
The query language used in the web service infrastructure provides a great deal of 
flexibility for interacting with the web service to gather results from network traffic datasets. 
A single query can be used to retrieve XML data from the system matching the query 
criteria. Domain specific XML is used to represent queries submitted via the web service. 
This section provides an overview of the language and the motivations for its design. Section 
3.3.3 describes the details of the language, section 3.3.4 defines rules for writing queries and 
section 3.3.5 provides examples queries. 
We do not make claims about the power and expressiveness of the query language. The 
language is not intended to be a relational or Turing complete language. It is instead designed 
for usability by leveraging the knowledge and expertise of security analysts and developers, 
allowing them to retrieve data from heterogeneous datasets with a single query operation. 
The expressiveness of the language allows for simple selection and union operations. The 
language's power is built to provide the greatest common denominator among SQL, XPath, 
XQuery and b+ tree searches, which are used in the current implementation to index large 
fiat file data sources. This design choice allows users to query different storage models via a 
consistent interface. 
A domain specific language was designed to meet several needs of security analysts. 
First, by using keywords and constructs from the networking lexicon the language allows 
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analysts to leverage their knowledge of the networking domain. This differs from a general-
purpose language like SQL in that elements and attributes in the XML document are familiar 
to those with networking backgrounds while constructs in SQL, such as SELECT and 
WHERE, have nothing to do with the context of the data space. The benefit of this design 
choice is that analysts can construct queries using their networking knowledge without 
understanding the details of the underlying data storage methods. 
Second, a domain specific language was chosen to limit the scope of the language and 
tailor it specifically towards information retrieval tasks for network security data. While 
building the requirements for the system, it was found that analysts primarily needed simple 
search capabilities over multiple large data sources. A typical example would be to retrieve 
all records for a given IP address for the last month. Given these types of operations, the 
language was built to reflect this need, allowing analysts to retrieve data from multiple 
sources with a common language, and in many cases a single query. 
Third, our design focuses on a two-phase approach to gathering and analyzing network 
security data. In the first phase, a subset of the data is gathered on basic search criteria, like 
time and IP address, obtained via information about the incident being investigated. In the 
second phase, the smaller dataset, in the form of an XML document, is analyzed through the 
use of XML processing tools like extensible stylesheet language (XSL), XPath and XQuery. 
The data analysis phase tends to be repeated multiple times on the same set of data. This 
would not be desirable to attempt on the entire dataset, as it is prohibitively large. Thus, our 
implementation focuses on providing a means of quickly and easily gathering data to be 
analyzed in the second phase. 
The final design choice for the language was to allow for simple parsing and rewriting. 
The constructs of the language are not overly complex and can be processed using a 
combination of XML libraries and custom code in the query processor. Additionally, the 
language design is such that queries can be quickly decomposed by a variety of criteria to 
allow for parallel processing. For example, a query specifying three data types to search can 
be broken apart into three separate queries and passed on to additional query processors to 
compute the result in parallel. 
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The end result of our design is an intuitive language for querying data relevant to 
network security investigations. Analysts at LANL can run queries for a variety of tasks, 
helping them evaluate and conclude incidents much more efficiently than in the past. The 
following subsections describe in detail the query language specification. 
3.3.3. Query language schema description 
This section details the schema of the web service's query language. The complete 
DTD is presented in appendix A. The Query element can contain four elements, including 
additional Query elements nested as sub-queries. The Timestamp element specifies a time 
range to search. Including the DataType element allows for specific datasets to be searched. 
Lastly the SearchField element is used to specify the selection criteria for the query. Results 
from multiple data types and sub-queries are concatenated in the result set, performing a 
union. 
Due to the time-series nature of the datasets used in network security, date and time 
information must be provided in each query document. To satisfy this requirement, one or 
more Timestamp elements must be included. The start attribute is mandatory and is used to 
specify the lower bound of the time range to search. The end attribute is optional and is used 
to specify the upper bound of the time range to search. When both start and end attributes are 
specified, they must be of the form "YYYY-MM-DD" or "YYYY-MM-DD 
HH:MM:SS.MS". The date format implies that the entire date should be searched while the 
timestamp format indicates the bound of the time range. If the end attribute is omitted, the 
start attribute must be of the form "YYYY-MM-DD", indicating that the entire date specified 
should be searched. Table 3.1 provides several example timestamp elements with 
descriptions of how the syntax is interpreted. 
The usage of the optional DataType element specifies data sources and sensors to be 
queried. Omitting this element causes all data sources to be searched and included in the 
result set. The type is a mandatory identifier such as "Snort" or "Netflow" in this case 
specifying Snort alerts or Netflow connection records respectively. In the case where 
multiple sensors of the same type are collecting data, the optional sensor attribute can be 
used to specify a particular collection point. When omitted, results from all sensors for the 
specified data type are returned. The values for the type and sensor attributes are obtained via 
the types action of the web service API as described in section 3.3.1. 
Table 3.1. Timestamp element examples 
Example Description 
<Timestamp start="2005-8-l"/> Return records with a timestamp at any 
time on August 1, 2005 
<Timestamp start="2005-7-l 1 11:00:00.00 
end="2005-7-l 1 13:00:00.00'7> 
<Timestamp start="2005- l - l "  
end="2005-6-30"/> 
Return records with a timestamp at any 
time during the first six months of 2005 
Return records with a timestamp between 
11 AM and 1PM on July 11, 2005. 
The SearchField element allows the specification of search criteria. The name 
attribute is the shorthand name of the field. An example name could be "srcip", representing 
a source IP address. The format attribute is the shorthand name of the data format as 
described in the system metadata. An example format could be "hexip", representing an IP 
address in hexadecimal. The predicate attribute defines the predicate in the search criteria. 
Supported predicates are greater than, less than, greater than equal to, less than equal, equal 
to and inclusive range. Note that the ">" and "<" symbols cannot be included in XML data 
and must be replaced with "&gt;" and "&lt;" respectively. The symbol was chosen for 
the range predicate because it avoids confusion with negative values when used in shorthand 
form within an attribute in the Query element. The value attribute specifies the value to apply 
the predicate against when a predicate other than range is specified. If a range predicate is 
specified, the lower and upper attributes must include values representing the inclusive 
bounds of the range. Information about search fields and representations is returned via the 
types action of the web service API as described in section 3.3.1 
The attributes in the Query element enable authentication and allow the query writer to 
specify search criteria in shorthand. The user and password fields are used to authenticate 
users trying to submit a query to the system. This mechanism can be used to implement 
access controls, a feature that is discussed in section 3.5.1. The remaining attributes {srcip, 
dstip and dstport) are italicized in appendix A, indicating that they are specific to the LANL 
implementation of the web service. Other fields can be added here depending on the search 
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fields available at the site deploying the web service. Values specified for the attributes are of 
the form "PREDICATE|VALUE" or "LOWER-UPPER", depending on the predicate 
chosen. If the range predicate is specified then "LOWER" is the lower bound of the range 
and "UPPER" is the upper bound of the range. If a predicate other than range is chosen then 
the predicate value ("%gt;", "%lt;", "%gt;=", "%lt;=", "=") should immediately precede the 
key value. If no predicate is specified, equality is assumed. As examples, 
srcip= "192.168.1.0-192.168.1.255" searches for source IP addresses in the 192.168.1 
subnet and dstport= "%gt;1024 " searches for destination ports greater than 1024. 
3.3.4. Query syntax rules 
Although most XML parsers allow for an XML document to be validated in 
accordance to the DTD, additional conditions must be checked to be sure that a query is 
correct. This section discusses these properties and establishes some rules that must be 
enforced by the query processor to assure that only correct queries are accepted. Assuring 
that queries conform to this specification is left to the query processor implementation. If 
these rules are not enforced, queries can be ambiguous and potentially return inconsistent 
results. 
In addition to adhering to the DTD and the date and time requirements, some additional 
rules are enforced when processing queries. Table 3.2 summarizes these rules and they are 
explained in detail below. 
Table 3.2. Query processing rules 
Rule Definition 
1 Nested queries adhere to the date/time ranges specified in 
the parent query, unless the parent query has no recursively 
specified date/time range 
2 Nested queries adhere to the data type specification in the 
parent query, unless the parent query has no recursively 
specified data type 
3 In order to be included in a result set, a dataset must contain 
all search attributes specified in the Query element and 
SearchField elements 
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The first rule is that overlapping Timestamp elements cannot be nested in sub-queries. 
For example, the user cannot submit a query specifying a date range of March through April 
at the root Query element and then specify a different date range in a nested query. This rule 
is necessary because conflicting or overlapping time stamps can lead to ambiguity in query 
processing. Rule 2 is similar to rule 1, stating that nested queries cannot have conflicting 
DataType definitions that can lead to ambiguity in query processing in the same way as 
having conflicting timestamps. 
Rules 1 and 2 refer to recursively defined time stamps and data types respectively. This 
language is used because nested sub queries are associated with a parent query, which may 
also be a nested query. This fact makes it necessary to recursively traverse a query tree in 
processing to identify the time stamps and data types for a query. 
Lastly, rule 3 deals with mapping attributes in the Query element to the datasets being 
searched and returned in the result set. Not every dataset has the search attributes for a given 
query. For instance, a data source may not have a destination IP address field. When a query 
is requested with destination IP address as a search criterion, that dataset cannot be search 
and thus cannot be returned in the result set. 
3.3.5. Query examples 
This section shows examples of queries used to request data via the web service. The 
examples shown in table 3.3 illustrate several correct and incorrect queries. For brevity, the 
user and password attributes are omitted in the examples. 
Queries 1, 2 and 3 are valid in accordance to the query language DTD and do not 
violate the rules from section 3.3.4. In these examples, all data sources will be queried, as no 
DataType element is specified. Query 1 performs a three-way selection match on source IP 
address, destination IP address and destination port for all dates in the year 2004. Query 2 has 
two sub queries that search for different source IP addresses over the date range defined in 
the parent query. Query 3 is logically equivalent to the second query but places a Timestamp 
element in each sub-query instead of the parent and also uses the SearchField construct 
instead of the Query attributes. 
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Table 3.3. Valid example queries 
Query XML 
1 <Query srcip="=192.168.1.100" dstip=" =1.2.3.4" dstport="l~ 1024"> 
<Timestamp start-'2004-01-01" end- '2004-12-3 !"/> 
</Query> 
2 <Query> 
<Timestamp start-'2005-01-01" end- '2005-06-01 "/> 
<Query srcip="=l92.168.1,100"/> 
<Query srcip="=l 92.168.1,200"/> 
<Query/> 
3 <Query> 
<Query> 
<SearchField name-'srcip" predicate: ="=" value="192.168. 
o
 
o
 
<Timestamp start-'2005-01-01" end= ="2005-06-01 "/> 
</Query> 
<Query srcip="l92.168.1,200"> 
<SearchField name="srcip" predicate1 ="=" value="192.168. 1.200"/> 
<Timestamp start="2005-01-01" end= ="2005-06-0 !"/> 
</Query> 
<Query/> 
In table 3.4, examples are provided to shown incorrectly written query examples along 
with corrections to make the queries valid. Incorrect or ambiguous syntax is italicized in the 
table. 
Queries 4 and 6 are incorrect according to the rules defined in section 3.3.4. Queries 5 
and 7 show possible ways that the queries can be fixed to adhere to the rules. Query 4 
violates rule 1, as the date ranges are ambiguous. The date ranges in bold conflict in that the 
parent query's range is not equal to the range in the first sub-query. This query is corrected 
by moving the root Query element's Timstamp element to the second sub-query, as shown in 
query 5. Query 6 violates rule 2 as the data types in bold are conflicting. This query can be 
corrected by moving the first DataType element into the body of the first sub-query, as 
shown in query 7. 
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Table 3.4. Invalid and corrected example queries 
Query XML 
4 <Query> 
<Timestamp starl= "2004-08-01 " end="2004-09-15 "/> 
<Query srcip="l 92.168.1.100"/> 
<Timestamp start= "2004-09-01 " end= "2004-09-
70 "A 
</Query> 
<Query srcip-' 192.168.1.200"/> 
</Query> 
5 <Query> 
<Query srcip-' 192.168.1.100"/> 
<Timestamp start="2004-09-01 " end-'2004-09-10"/> 
</Query> 
<Query srcip-'192.168.1.200"> 
<Timestamp start="2004-08-01 " end="2004-09-l 5"/> 
</Query> 
</Query> 
6 <Query> 
"f7 "/> 
<Timestamp start="2005-06-01 " end="2004-09-l 5"/> 
<Query srcip-'192.168.1.100"/> 
<Query srcip-'192.168.1.200"> 
<DataType type= "t2 "/> 
</Query> 
</Query> 
7 <Query> 
<Timestamp start="2005-06-01 " end="2004-09-15"/> 
<Query srcip="l 92.168.1.100"/> 
<DataType type="tl'7> 
</Query> 
<Query srcip-' 192.168.1,200"> 
<DataType type="t2"/> 
</Query> 
</Query> 
3.4. Result Formats 
With recent advances in XML technology and the heterogeneous nature of network 
security data, XML is a logical and effective means of representing result sets. As it is self-
describing, XML can help reduce problems of ambiguity associated with this type of data. 
The extensible nature of XML is also very appealing when dealing with network security 
data as the formats and data sources are continually changing. 
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Commercial vendors like Microsoft and Oracle are focusing more attention on 
implementing XML query languages like XPath and XQuery in their relational database 
management systems. These emerging technologies, along with transform languages like 
XSLT, make XML even more appealing as a storage method for performing complex data 
analysis and event correlation. 
It is recognized that no two sites are likely to have access to the same logs and data 
sources. Therefore, the result schema is generalized and is to be extended by sites 
implementing the web service. Omitted are the elements and attributes of the data types 
themselves. It is the responsibility of the site implementing the web service framework to 
develop, publish and maintain their own individual schema reflecting the data being made 
available to other sites. The base DTD is provided in appendix B. 
Result documents begin with the Result element, which contains three possible 
children: QueryError, DataType and QueryResult. The QueryError element will contain an 
error message if there was an error while processing the query, for example a user 
authentication error or a malformed XML query. DataType elements are returned in the 
document when the types action is executed by the client and provide information about data 
types, sensors and search fields. The QueryResult element contains records returned 
according to the XML query when the query action is specified. 
The DataType element is used to define the data sources that can be queried via the 
web service. The id attribute defines the unique identifier for each data source to be used in 
the DataType element of the query schema. The name attribute is a text name of this type that 
can be used in lieu of the identifier. The DataType element can contain as children two 
elements: Sensor and SearchField. Like its parent, a Sensor element contains an id and name 
attribute, either of which can be used in the sensor attribute of the DataType element in the 
query schema. The SearchField element is used to describe the fields that can be queried for 
the parent DataType via the web service. 
Each SearchField element contains an optional description and a required name 
attribute. The description attribute provides a text description of the field while the name 
attribute is used in the name attribute of the SearchField element of the query schema when 
constructing queries. The SearchField element contains at least one child of both Predicate 
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and Format. The Predicate element has a single value attribute and defines the types of 
searches that can be executed for this field. Format elements contain information about data 
formats supported by the web service for the parent SearchField. The name attribute is the 
value used in the format attribute of the SearchField element of the query schema. The 
optional description attribute is a text description of the representation. The default attribute 
is optional and set to "yes" if the representation is that used by default by the query 
processor. For instance, the default format for specifying an IP address might be in the form 
of a dot quad IP address. In this case, the default attribute is set to "yes" for this format but 
set to "no" for the 32-bit integer representation of an IP address. The format attribute of the 
query schema's SearchField element is used to specify how the corresponding search values 
should be interpreted in query processing, for example <SearchField name="srcip" 
format="ip_hex" predicate="=" value="01020304'7> is equivalent to <SearchField 
name="srcip" format="ip" predicate="=" value="1.2.3.4"/>. 
Lastly, the QueryResult element contains results returned from the query processor as 
an XML document. The children of this element are to be defined by the site implementing 
the web service. The result DTD in appendix B provides an example child element 
implemented in the LANL prototype. 
3.5. System Design and Implementation 
A prototype system, DISARM, has been implemented at LANL to provide analysts 
with single query access to multiple terabytes of log data gathered since January of 2002. 
Datasets stored within the system include web logs, IDS alerts and network connection 
records. Some data, such as IDS alerts, resides in relational databases. Other, multi-terabyte 
datasets are stored in flat files and indexed with b+ trees on key fields, including source IP 
address, destination IP address, and destination port. Figure 3.1 details the prototype system 
architecture. 
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Figure 3.1. System architecture: client and web service 
When dealing with large static datasets, b+ trees provide a good tradeoff between 
storage overhead and search performance as shown in section 3.6. DiSARM uses Berkeley 
DB databases to index data streams in real-time. Data stream indexing can be split across 
multiple nodes for scalability. Periodically, Berkeley DB instances are aggregated from 
multiple nodes and converted into static b+ trees. The query processor can access both the 
Berkeley DB databases and static b+ trees to provide real-time access to multi-terabyte 
datasets. 
The web service satisfies requests for schémas and data types via the metadata handler. 
Queries submitted to the servlet are validated and submitted to the query processor in the 
Query Handler module. The query processor returns results to the servlet via the Result 
Processor Module, which converts raw data records into an XML document to return to the 
client. By acting as a proxy, the web service module was added to the existing system 
without having to modify the query processor. Because data in the system is stored in its 
original state, data is converted into an XML document each time a result document is 
generated. Section 3.6 discusses the performance penalty for this conversion and shows that 
the tradeoff between storage overhead and query performance is acceptable. 
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The DiSARM web service is implemented as a Java servlet that responds to the client 
on behalf of the query processor, which is detailed in figure 3.2. The base web service 
specification has been implemented in DiSARM according to sections 3.3 and 3.4. Each 
HTTP request to the web service provides an action parameter with one of three values: 
"query", "schema" and "types". These parameters are summarized in table 3.5. The schema 
action returns the query DTD or the result DTD as specified by the additional type parameter. 
The types action returns an XML document that defines the data sources that are made 
available for querying through the web service. Table 3.6 describes three additional 
parameters for the query action: "query", "limit" and "total". Only the query parameter is 
required by the API definition when specifying the query action. The value of the query 
parameter is the XML query to be executed by the web service. The remaining parameters, 
limit and total, were implemented at LANL to provide additional functionality, optionally 
limiting the number of records returned to the client by the web service. 
Requests are processed by the web service as follows: the client opens an HTTP 
connection to the service and submits a POST request containing the action to perform along 
with any additional parameters. If the schema or types action is requested, the web service 
can complete the request. If the query action is requested, the servlet passes the query to the 
41 
query processor, which can access flat files, XML documents or relational databases 
depending on how the requested data is stored. 
Table 3.5. Action parameters 
Parameter Value Description Additional Parameters 
gwery Return results, as XML per the result DTD, 
for the XML query contained in the query 
parameter 
See table 3.6 
schema Return either the query DTD or the result type=query or 
DTD as per the type parameter type=result 
Return the data types and sensors, as XML 
per the result DTD, that can be queried at 
this site 
None 
Table 3.6. Parameters for query action 
Parameter Value Description 
gwgyy The query to be executed as an XML document 
limit The maximum number of records to return per 
data type 
total The maximum total number of records to be 
returned; total >= limit 
The DiSARM query processor is able to perform parallel query execution by 
decomposing queries by data type, sensor and time range. After decomposition, the resulting 
queries can be sent to query processors on remote nodes. The query processor that received 
the request from the web service layer then aggregates results from the nodes and sends the 
results to the web service. 
Large flat file data sources are currently indexed using b+ trees and stored on NFS 
mounted RAID arrays. These structures have been designed to offer a performance trade off 
between low overhead and query power. The key values currently supported are source IP 
address, destination IP address, destination port and start timestamp. Each key value maps to 
a file offset where a record matching the key value is stored. MySQL is used for smaller data 
sources, including IDS, intrusion prevention system (IPS) and anomaly detection system 
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(ADS) alerts. By using DiSARM, analysts can query these different data storage technologies 
in a uniform manner. 
3.5.1. Security features 
Security in DiSARM is central to the system's design and implementation, as shown in 
figure 3.3. The system has integrated security elements from the bottom up, providing an 
effective solution for storing sensitive data sources. Table 3.7 summarizes the security 
features native to the prototype system. 
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Figure 3.3. Generalized system architecture 
Table 3.7. Security features 
Component Security Feature(s) 
Client Applications Communicate with web service via SSL; provide user name 
and password 
Web Service Communicate with client and query processor via SSL 
Query Processor Communicate with web service via SSL; authenticate user; 
enforce per-record access controls 
JDBC Connection to RDBMS requires username and password; 
Only a fixed set of hosts can connect to server 
XPath None 
b+ tree File system permissions and NFS exports restrict access to 
query processor 
MySQL Permissions set to enforce per-host user authentication to 
query processor 
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The client must connect to the web service via SSL to initiate a request. The web 
service must then submit the request to the query processor. In each case, communications 
are via SSL to protect both the query content as well as the results. Clients must provide a 
valid SSL certificate to open a HTTP connection to the web service. This also holds true for 
communications between the web service and the query processor, which can reside on 
different servers. In this case, raw TCP sockets are protected with SSL instead of an HTTP 
connection. 
The query processor implementation provides authentication and access control via the 
user and password attributes in the root Query element of each query to enable authentication 
at the query server. The system is integrated with a one-time password authentication service 
for interactions with users and a traditional reusable password mechanism for interacting 
with applications utilizing the web service. 
Once the query processor authenticates the client, the user credentials are used to 
enforce access controls to data in the system on a per-record basis. For example, a system 
administrator might be responsible for a set of servers in a particular network subnet. The 
access controls for this user can be configured to only allow access to records relevant to that 
subnet. The query engine dynamically filters out any query results not pertaining to the 
subnet prior to sending data to the web service. As with SSL, the trade off between privacy 
and performance is a factor. Checking each record in a result stream can be an expensive 
operation depending on the number of access controls being enforced. This feature is 
optional, as users can be configured to have no restrictions, thus eliminating the need to 
check individual records. 
Communications with MySQL servers occur over JDBC and are restricted to only 
communicate with the query processors through MySQL's security settings. Although XPath 
does not provide any security measures, the underlying XML documents are protected by file 
permission restrictions and NFS export control. The b+ tree data structures and flat file logs 
are protected in the same manner. 
Lastly, fiat file logs and XML documents are protected by automated file integrity 
checking to ensure the underlying data is not manipulated or corrupted. A SHA-1 checksum 
of each file is periodically generated and compared against an existing checksum stored in a 
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secure MySQL database. An alert is sent to the system administrator if the checksums do not 
match, along with the time at which the file last passed its integrity check. 
3.5.2. Testing 
To test the prototype system, unit testing was performed from the bottom up on each 
system component. The b+ tree implementation was written in 2002 and has been tested 
rigorously by LANL's network security team for a number of years. The query processor was 
built on top of the b+ tree implementation to access multi-terabyte datasets. Access to data 
sources in MySQL databases and XML documents has been added to the query processor as 
needed. 
Each time a new data source is integrated into the system it is implemented and tested 
independent of the existing system. This allows for efficient unit and case testing of the new 
component without the need of testing the entire system. Typically, a web interface is built 
on top of the query processor for the new data type and tested by analysts who report any 
bugs or data inconsistencies to the lead developer. 
After a successful testing period with the web interface, a new data type can be 
integrated into the web service. At this point, as much as possible of the web interface code is 
reused and integrated into the web service. To test the XML conversion code, an XML parser 
validates several test case result documents. Then, these same documents are compared with 
results generated via the web interface. 
3.6. System Evaluation 
This section presents the performance of our prototype system. First, section 3.6.1 
details scalability of the prototype implementation, by showing its strength over MySQL for 
high-throughput data capture. Next, section 3.6.2 shows that our b+ tree implementation 
requires much less storage overhead than MySQL, as our approach keeps only a single online 
copy of the data. Section 3.6.3 show the query performance of our implementation compared 
to MySQL for a limited set of queries. Lastly, section 3.6.4 presents the overhead imposed on 
the system by implementing the web service layer on top of the existing query processor. 
45 
3.6.1. Data capture performance 
Data capture is an important of the DiSARM architecture. Any system attempting to 
capture and provide access to large network traffic datasets must be able to scale to meet the 
needs of a dynamic and rapidly growing network. DiSARM uses Berkeley DB to index data 
streams across multiple nodes in real-time, allowing the system to scale. This section shows 
the performance benefits of this approach as compared to using a relational database, in this 
case MySQL. 
NetHead data from two days was used to evaluate the throughput of the system 
prototype. The first dataset was from April 2002, containing approximately seven million 
records. The second dataset was from September 2003 and contained approximately 20 
million records. The large difference in the number of records can be attributed to an increase 
in network activity coinciding with the Microsoft DCOM vulnerability. These datasets were 
chosen to illustrate how rapidly the size of the datasets grows. Due to the increase in port 135 
and 445 scans, the number of NetHead records tripled over a one-week period. Until the 
number of DCOM scans increased so dramatically in late August 2003, the April 1 dataset 
was very representative of a typical day's worth of NetHead data. 
The primary design decision that impacts throughput is the backend storage 
mechanism. MySQL (version 3.23.53) was chosen for comparison because it is widely used 
in intrusion detection systems like Snort and thus many intrusion detection analysts have 
experience in its operation. Two dual Pentium III 1 GHz computers with 1 GB RAM and 
gigabit Ethernet were used for the test. For the MySQL evaluation, records were inserted one 
at a time into an empty table and the default table and database options were used. A client 
program on one node sent each record to a MySQL server on the second node. For the 
DiSARM evaluation, one node streamed data to a DiSARM server on the second node, 
which indexed the data stream. Figure 3.4 illustrates the results of this benchmark. 
46 
Comparison: MySQL vs. Berkeley DB 
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Figure 3.4. Backend data store performance 
Although the throughput rate was acceptable for the 2002 data, the throughput fell 46% 
on the 2003 data to an average of 135 records per second. At this rate, it took 1.6 days to load 
the dataset into MySQL. By comparison, the same test using Berkeley DB (version 4.1.24) 
yielded superior throughput while only showing 24% degradation in performance on the 
larger dataset. By contrast this dataset took only 13 hours to load using Berkeley DB. Using 
MySQL's bulk data load capabilities yield improved results although these results are not 
applicable as the real-time requirement of the system is not satisfied. 
System Throughput 
Figure 3.5. System throughput 
Figure 3.5 illustrates scalability, another important aspect of system performance. To 
deal with rapidly growing datasets, the system must be able to scale. For this benchmark, 
three DiSARM configurations were evaluated: single-node, three-node and five-node. In the 
three and five node setups, data was sent to one node and then split to the remaining nodes 
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which indexed the data stream in parallel. As shown, the system scaled well over the 2002 
dataset as additional nodes were added for indexing. 
3.6.2. Storage performance 
The desire to keep storage overhead at a minimum was a key driver in the design and 
implementation of DiSARM. Two long-term storage methods were examined: relational 
databases, in this case MySQL, and static b+ trees. Both approaches have advantages and 
disadvantages. Relational databases provide the user with a great deal of power in 
manipulating the data. The drawback is that the overhead is high and it introduces data 
redundancy. One of the design goals was to keep a single online copy of large datasets. 
Storing each record in a relational database and storing the raw, or native, data dramatically 
increases the amount of online data. To avoid this, static b+ tree indexing was implemented 
in DiSARM. The advantage of this approach is that the native data is indexed, eliminating 
the need for an additional online copy of the data. The disadvantage is that the analyst no 
longer can leverage the power of a relational database. 
For this benchmark, three cases were examined: a relational database with native data, 
a relational database without native data and static b+ trees indexing native data. MySQL 
3.23.53 was used on Mac OS X version 10.2.7. For the b+ tree and MySQL databases, four 
fields were indexed: destination address, source address, destination port and start timestamp. 
As is evident in table 3.8, static b+ trees require 45.5% less storage than using MySQL as the 
access method without storing the native data. Keeping an online copy of the native dataset 
and storing it in MySQL as well requires 277.5% of the storage compared to only keeping 
the native dataset online. 
Table 3.8. Storage overhead 
Storage Method Size (MB) % Diff 
Native 858.4 100.0 
Native, Indexed 1124.5 131.0 
MySQL 1523.6 177.5 
MySQL, Native copy 2382.0 277.5 
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3.6.3. Query performance 
To compare the b+ tree query performance to MySQL, five different queries were run 
five consecutive times on a dual Xeon server with 2 GB of RAM. MySQL version 4.0.18 
was used for comparison in this test. Table 3.9 illustrates the averaged results from each 
query. 
Table 3.9. Query performance 
Query 
b+ T ree 
(time in seconds) 
MySQL 
(time in seconds) % Diff # Results 
1 7.84 0.45 5.69% 18 
2 0.37 0.03 6.94% 184 
3 0.36 1.60 448.37% 758 
4 98.16 1,012.94 1,031.93% 820,410 
5 136.53 1,831.13 1,341.19% 369,186 
For brevity and confidentiality, the query syntax used to generate the above results is 
not included. Query 1 returned results matching on a source address and destination port. 
Query 2 returned results from the same destination port as query 1 but with no restriction on 
source address. Query 3 returned results matching on a small range of destination ports. 
Query 4 returned results matching a highly active destination port. Query 5 returned results 
matching a larger port range than Query 3. 
As is evident in table 3.9, the b+ tree implementation performed well for cases 
generating a large number of results. The results from queries 1 and 2 were substantially 
better when using MySQL, as the caching mechanism helped consecutive runs perform very 
well. Even so, the total time to return these queries was low when using either system. 
These initial results support the decision to use the b+ tree data structure as the 
underlying data retrieval mechanism. Performance is superior to MySQL when dealing with 
large volumes of data, as was the initial design goal of the system. It is also reassuring that 
queries with small result sets also return quickly, although not as fast as when using MySQL 
in some cases. 
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3.6.4. Web service performance 
The evaluation of the DiSARM web service layer focuses on the additional overhead 
incurred by the web services layer. As discussed in the implementation section, the web 
service servlet receives queries from the client over HTTP and sends the query to the query 
processor. Results are returned to the servlet in their native format or as comma separated 
value records in the case of data types stored in relational databases. The servlet parses each 
record according to its type and outputs an XML representation of the record back to the 
client over HTTP. 
Two factors are measured in the evaluation: query performance and storage overhead. 
Six different data sources are used for the evaluation: TippingPoint UnityOne Intrusion 
Prevention Appliance block logs, R3000 web logs, NetHead connection records, Snort IDS 
alerts, Estimated Moving Average Anomaly Detector (EMAAD) anomaly alerts and LEAP 
flow records. NetHead is a connection-based intrusion detection and network forensics tool 
developed at LANL. EMAAD is an unsupervised statistical anomaly detector also developed 
at LANL that is adept at discovering hosts exhibiting unusual scanning activity. The queries 
used in the evaluation have subnet information obfuscated using asterisks. For both tests, two 
datasets were collected: one where the client connected to the web service via HTTP over 
SSL and another where the client connected to the query processor via a raw TCP socket 
over SSL. By comparing these results we show the overhead incurred by the web service 
implementation. 
Each evaluation query shown in table 3.10 was executed five times, both with a client 
connecting to the query processor and with a client connecting to the web service. The same 
test was recorded with the client reading between 1000 and 10,000 results, varying by 1000 
results for each test. This test shows that there is a fixed cost associated with processing 
results through the web service layer. The query timer was started when the first record was 
available to be read by the client. The timer was stopped when the last record, again between 
1000 and 10,000, was read. The choice to time queries after the query processor had 
computed the result set was made as the query processor is processing the same query if the 
client connects via the raw socket or the web service and thus does not need to be included in 
the overall time of the test. 
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Table 3.10. Evaluation queries 
Type Query Results 
TippingPoint <Query srcip=" 128.165.0.0-128.165.255.255"> 55,624 
<Timestamp start="2005-7-ll" end="2005-7-17'7> 
</Query> 
<Query srcip="128.165.***.0-128.165.***.255"> 48,407 
<Timestamp start="2005-7-l 8"/> 
</Query> 
<Query srcip="128.165.***.0-128.165.***.255"> 39,578 
<Timestamp start="2005-7-l 8'7> 
</Query> 
<Query srcip="l 28.165.0.0-128.165.255.255"> 10,321 
<Timestamp start="2005-l -1 " end="2005-7-31 "/> 
</Query> 
<Query srcip="128.165.0.0-128.165.255.255"> 12,725 
<Timestamp start="2004-l-1 " end="2005-7-31 "/> 
</Query> 
<Query srcip="128.165.***.0-128.165.***.255"> 393,993 
<Timestamp start="2005-7-l 8'7> 
</Query> 
^3000 
NetHead 
Snort 
LFAP 
The goal of this test is to show the relative performance of clients connecting to the 
web service versus connecting directly to a socket on the query processor. As shown in figure 
3.6, the TippingPoint query results show the smallest performance penalty at 2.6%. The 
remaining datasets showed reasonable performance although the LFAP dataset was 12.1% 
slower compared to the raw socket connection. 
The second area of evaluation is the performance penalty incurred by converting data 
from its native format into the web service's XML representation. Two factors are tested: 
processing time overhead and storage overhead. Figure 3.7 shows the processing overhead 
and figure 3.8 shows the storage overhead for the example query. 
The processing overhead results show the additional percentage of processing time for 
converting it into the XML document. The application used in the evaluation reads the results 
from the evaluation queries into memory and then times how long it took to convert the 
records into the XML document. The application used the same XML conversion algorithms 
as the web service and sent the results to /dev/null. As shown, the processing overhead 
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associated with XML conversion is negligible on a per-record basis. The more important 
factors are I/O and parsing records into objects. 
WS Performance vs Direct Connection 
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Figure 3.6. Web service performance overhead 
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Figure 3.8. Web service result set overhead 
Storage overhead is important to evaluate, as XML data is larger than data in its native 
format due to the addition of tags. This can impact both memory usage and disk usage, both 
of which are important concerns when dealing with large volume data sources. Our next 
evaluation shows the amount of additional storage needed to store the query results of the 
evaluation queries in the XML format compared to storing the results in their native format. 
These results are encouraging, as the data sources with the largest relative overhead, Snort 
and EMAAD, were the lowest volume data sources in our evaluation environment. 
3.7. 'Summary 
In summary, we present a design and implementation that provides analysts with the 
tools necessary to perform network security investigations over multi-terabyte datasets across 
multiple sites using web services. A domain specific query language using XML documents 
to represent queries of network security data source is defined along with a generalized XML 
document format for returning query results. We also define the API needed to exchange data 
between remote sites and understand the supported result formats. 
In evaluating the prototype system we have provided results for data capture 
throughput, query performance, storage overhead and overhead imposed by the web service 
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layer. Scalable, high-throughput data capture and retrieval has been shown using the 
NetHead dataset as a test case. Furthermore, the static b+ tree indexing implementation 
minimizes storage overhead yet still provides analysts with a powerful tool for querying data 
from heterogeneous datasets. Finally we show that the overhead of utilizing web services is 
acceptable for the prototype system. 
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4. A Framework for Alert Verification and Event Correlation 
As attacks on networks continue to grow in volume and complexity, IDSs research has 
begun to focus on alert correlation to address the inherent limitations of traditional IDSs. In 
this chapter we present a framework design and implementation that provides a scalable 
solution for two important components of alert correlation: alert verification and event 
correlation. 
In our framework, a broker application maintains an alert database containing IDS 
alerts while distributed software agents perform alert verification and event correlation of 
alert instances. Agents can be autonomous or event-driven and are designed to run on 
multiple hosts to ensure scalability of complex tasks. 
In our implementation, agents communicate with the broker via a web service 
architecture, making them easy to build and deploy in heterogeneous networks. In our 
implementation, three IDSs from multiple paradigms are supported, showing that the 
framework can be applied to various IDS types. 
4.1. Introduction 
Alert correlation has become an active research area in network security and intrusion 
detection due to the growing volume and complexity of attacks on networks. Correlation is 
used to reduce the number of low-level, or elementary, alerts and provide knowledge 
discovery of complex patterns and relationships in alert datasets. 
Research in the area of alert correlation is closely tied to the work described in this 
chapter. Correlation techniques invariably use some degree of expert knowledge to establish 
how alerts can be linked. Valdes and Skinner use a probability matrix to determine how 
incoming alerts should be correlated within the EMERALD system [15]. This technique 
showed to be effective on the 2000 DARPA dataset although the accuracy of the probability 
matrix was essential for adequate performance. Another system used the JIGSAW predicate 
language to represent alerts as hyper-alert correlation graphs [16] and requires domain 
knowledge and network facts, such as host and vulnerability information, to provide effective 
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correlation. Similar work by Cuppens and Miège uses the LAMBDA specification language 
to achieve correlation [10]. 
As with any system, the quality of data, in this case intrusion detection system (IDS) 
alerts, determines the quality of the results. The outcome of alert correlation depends on IDS 
alerts with low false positive rates. Frequently occurring false positives in the dataset lead to 
inaccurate results regardless of the algorithm used for alert correlation. 
To reduce false positives, an alert verification phase is necessary prior to correlation. 
This process is highly dynamic and dependent on domain knowledge of network security. An 
example of alert verification is correlating vulnerability information with a known IDS 
signature. If the target host is vulnerable to the detected attack, the alert can be ranked ahead 
of other similar alerts. Likewise, if the host is not vulnerable to the attack, for example an 
exploit for a Windows vulnerability on a Linux system, the alert can be marked as a false 
positive. 
Event correlation is another important aspect of the alert verification process. The 
previous example uses correlated vulnerability information to verify the alert. This is an 
example of event correlation, the process of finding information related to an IDS alert that is 
relevant in its analysis. Event information can be found in logs or other information sources 
such as a network knowledge base. 
Additionally, when discussing alert verification and event correlation, scalability and 
flexibility must be considered. If a system cannot scale to meet the demand of large 
production networks then the techniques, no matter how useful, will not be used in practice. 
Likewise rigidly designed or monolithic systems cannot adapt to highly dynamic networks. A 
flexible, yet scalable, solution is needed to address these limitations. Valeur et al. describe a 
framework that incorporates alert verification and event correlation functionality in [35]. Our 
framework is designed to contribute to existing research in this area by improving upon 
limitations of the existing work, such as scalability and flexibility. 
We describe a framework that addresses four key areas: alert verification, event 
correlation, scalability and flexibility. Software agents are deployed within the framework to 
provide alert verification and event correlation capabilities. Agents are autonomous and can 
reside on multiple hosts ensuring scalability. Alert information is stored and maintained by 
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an alert broker. Agents and the alert broker communicate via a web service interface, 
allowing the framework to span network boundaries and making the system flexible and easy 
to deploy. 
Our framework is lightweight yet has a powerful set of features. The broker receives 
new IDS alerts from alert agents that gather alerts from the IDS sensors. The design of our 
system is IDS independent, supporting alerts from misuse IDSs, ADSs and intrusion 
prevention systems (IPSs). 
The broker also handles requests and responses from evaluation agents. Evaluation 
agents are asynchronous processes that request alerts from the broker as needed for alert 
verification and event correlation tasks. The broker determines which alerts to send to the 
agent based on event driven rules, allowing for hierarchical processing of IDS alerts. 
Computationally expensive evaluation agents can depend upon actions of lightweight agents 
to assure that the system does not perform unnecessary computation. For example, an 
evaluation agent can be written to check that a network connection was successfully 
established between the target host and the attacker during the attack indicated in the IDS 
alert. The broker assures that agents dependent cannot process the alert unless the agent finds 
evidence that a connection was established. 
Agents can send three types of information to the broker: alert assertions, correlated 
events and informational messages. Alert assertions are made by the agent to apply a label, 
such as false positive or valid, to an alert. The broker maintains an entry per alert for each 
agent's assertion, which can be abstracted to represent an overall ranking for the alert. 
Correlated events can be gathered from any number of data sources by the agent and returned 
to the broker. The broker stores this information, which can be used for a variety of tasks in 
analyzing and processing of IDS alerts. Informational messages are attached to alerts in the 
broker and provide a means for agents to add free text comments to individual alerts. For 
instance, an agent asserting an alert as a false positive can add informational messages 
explaining to the analyst how the agent came to this conclusion. 
Our prototype framework implementation uses web services for communication 
between the broker and agents. Alerts from alert agents and correlated events returned by 
evaluation agents are stored in a relational database and can be exported as XML. At LANL, 
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we have deployed several evaluation agents that provide alert verification and event 
correlation capabilities for three IDSs used in practice. 
4.2. Framework Design 
The alert evaluation and event correlation framework, as shown in figure 4.1, is 
comprised of four entities as shown in: alert agents, an alert broker, an alert database and 
evaluation agents. Alert agents send alerts from IDSs to the alert broker. The alert broker 
stores alerts in the alert database and sends alerts to the evaluation agents when requested. 
Evaluation agents are autonomous software agents that request alerts from the broker, 
process these alerts and return pertinent information to the alert broker. 
Evaluation agents perform functions of event correlation and alert verification. An 
evaluation agent is further classified as an event correlation agent, an alert verification agent 
or a hybrid agent depending on the functions performed by the agent. Event correlation 
agents process IDS alerts by locating events in log records or other information sources that 
are related to the IDS alert and send the correlated events to the broker to store in the alert 
database. Alert verification agents use expert rules and corroborative information to assert 
the validity IDS alerts. Hybrid agents perform both event correlation and alert verification, as 
illustrated by the overlapping dashed rectangles in figure 4.1. 
Communication between the broker and agents is handled by messaging, allowing for 
entities in the framework to reside on multiple hosts for scalability and flexibility in 
deployment. The technical details of message passing are dependent on implementation. The 
prototype system described in section 4.3 uses a combination of HTTP-based web services 
and XML information content for messaging and information exchange. 
The following subsections are arranged as follows: section 4.2.1 describes the alert 
agent design, section 4.2.2 describes the alert evaluation agent design and section 4.2.3 
describes the alert broker design. 
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4.2.1. Alert agent design 
Alert agents are the processes responsible for sending IDS alerts to the alert broker. 
The agent has two functions: obtaining state information from the alert broker and sending 
alerts. 
When an alert agent is initialized, it obtains state information from the alert broker to 
determine which alerts to send. The agent maintains an ordered list of alerts with unique alert 
identifiers defined by the agent. Alerts are placed on the list as they are generated by the IDS 
and are removed from the list when sent to the broker. 
The list is needed to maintain synchronization with the alert database by assuring that 
all alerts generated by the IDS are sent to the broker exactly once. To obtain state 
information, the agent sends a state message to the broker. The broker returns the last alert 
identifier sent by the agent. 
After obtaining the state information from the broker, the agent can send new alerts to 
the broker. The next alert to send is the alert in the ordered list that follows the alert identifier 
returned by the broker. This may or may not be the first element of the list depending on 
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whether the agent exited safely prior to being restarted. If the list is empty, this implies that 
all alerts from the IDS have been sent to the broker and the agent must wait until new alerts 
are added to the list. 
To send an alert, the alert agent sends an alert message to the broker that includes the 
alert identifier and information content. The broker stores this information in the alert 
database and replies with a success indication if the operation was processed correctly. An 
error message is returned if the message could not be processed. If the operation was 
successful, the alert agent removes the alert from the ordered list and continues by sending 
the next alert. 
4.2.2. Alert evaluation agent design 
To process an alert, an alert evaluation agent requests an alert from the broker by 
sending a next message. The broker determines which alert the agent needs to process next, a 
process that is described in section 4.2.3. The broker sends back the information content of 
the next alert, along with a unique identifier, that needs to be processed by the agent. The 
agent then processes the alert and sends back one or more responses to the broker. 
An evaluation agent provides the alert broker with three types of information: general 
information, assertions and correlated events. The three types are shown in table 4.1 and are 
sent to the broker as an information message with a parameter identifying the type of 
information that is being added to the alert. 
Table 4.1. Types of information returned to the broker by alert evaluation agents. 
Info Type Description Data Type 
genera/ Miscellaneous information about alert processing or 
free text comments for users 
Text 
A floating-point number between -1.0 and 1.0; 
positive values indicate a valid alert; negative values 
indicate an invalid alert; zero indicates unknown 
Scalar 
event An event record or piece of information related to the Record 
alert, as determined by the agent content 
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General information is sent to the broker to add contextual, free-text information about 
the processing that is being performed on the alert. The agent sends a message to the broker 
that includes the alert identifier and the information content that is being added. For example, 
the agent could return information on the execution time of a particular alert evaluation task, 
which could be used by a security analyst to tune the agent. 
Assertion information is returned by an evaluation agent to provide the alert broker 
with information on the validity of the alert. The value returned by the agent is a floating­
point number between -1.0 and 1.0, with a positive value indicating valid alert and negative 
values indicating an invalid alert. The value zero is returned if the agent cannot verify the 
alert for any reason. The agent's determination of what constitutes a valid or invalid alert is 
dependent on the particular agent implementation. 
By using floating-point values for verification, agents can be implemented to return 
validity assertions with a confidence factor. For instance, an agent can return a value of 0.8 if 
it is 80% certain that an alert is valid. This is useful in practice as in many cases the 
verification process is influenced by low quality or missing data. 
Event information is returned by an alert correlation agent to provide the broker with 
information related to the alert that may be of use to processes and users analyzing the alert. 
Correlated events are stored in the alert database by the alert broker. As with assertion 
information, gathering event information is dependent on the agent's implementation. In 
sections 4.3.4, 4.3.5 and 4.3.6 we present examples of event correlation agents that have been 
implemented in our prototype system. 
Evaluation agents send a complete message to the alert broker when processing of an 
alert is complete. By using a separate message to signal completion, the agent can send 
multiple information messages to the broker if needed. The ability to send multiple messages 
allows for agents to perform tasks of alert verification, event correlation or a combination of 
the two, providing flexibility in the design of alert evaluation agents. 
Another benefit of the complete message is to allow agents to operate asynchronously. 
When an alert is sent to an evaluation agent, the broker places the alert in the in progress 
state. The broker takes no action on this alert until the evaluation replies with a complete 
message at a later point in time. While in the in progress state, the evaluation agent can take 
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any necessary action and requires no additional interaction with the broker for the alert until 
the complete message is sent whereupon the broker sets the alert state to processed indicating 
that the alert has been processed by the agent. Alert state management is described in the 
following section. 
4.2.3. Alert broker design 
The alert broker is designed to handle messages from alert agents and alert evaluation 
agents and maintain the alert database. The broker also maintains a list of alert and evaluation 
agents and must be capable of uniquely identifying and authenticating each entity. This is 
necessary as the broker must be able to associate messages with agents and also assure that 
only valid agents are interacting with the broker. Managing and identification of agents is 
implementation dependent. 
The messages in table 4.2 show the broker's functionality and have been described in 
sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 above. The remainder of this section provides additional information 
specific to the alert broker for the processing of these messages. 
An alert agent sends the state message to the broker upon initialization. The broker 
maintains an entry storing the last agent-defined alert identifier for each alert agent 
associated with the broker. The identifier is returned to the agent so that it can restart 
processing at the point of the last successfully processed alert. The identifier is updated upon 
successful completion of an alert message. 
The alert message is sent by the alert agent to the broker containing alert content from 
an IDS associated with the alert agent along with the agent-defined alert identifier. The 
broker is responsible for parsing and storing the alert content in the alert database. If the alert 
is successfully processed, the broker updates the agent's alert identifier entry and returns a 
success message to the alert agent. If the alert cannot be processed, an error message is 
returned to the agent. 
The next message is sent to the broker by an alert evaluation agent to request the next 
alert to be processed. The alert broker maintains an ordered list of alerts to be processed by 
each agent. The first alert is sent to the agent in the next reply and removed from the list. 
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Table 4.2. Summary of alert broker messages 
Message Description Parameters Return Values 
state Sent by alert agent requesting alert None Alert identifier 
processing state 
alert Sent by alert agent sending an IDS alert Alert identifier; None 
to the alert broker alert content 
MgXf Sent by evaluation agent to request a None Alert identifier; 
new alert for processing alert content 
information, Sent by evaluation agent to provide Alert identifier; None 
general miscellaneous free-text information information content 
about an alert 
information, Sent by alert verification agent to assert Alert identifier; None 
assertion that an alert is valid, invalid or assertion value 
unknown 
information, Sent by event correlation agent to Alert identifier; None 
eve»# associate one or more events with an event(s) content 
alert 
complete Sent by alert evaluation agent when Alert identifier None 
processing of an alert is complete and 
all information messages have been 
sent 
The maintenance of the alert list is implementation specific but allows for the creation 
of agent dependencies in the broker. Each alert in the alert database has a state associated 
with each evaluation agent that is maintained by the alert broker. Alerts can be labeled "in 
progress", "processed", "conditional" or "available". An "in progress" alert is an alert that 
has been sent to the corresponding evaluation agent via a next message and a "processed" 
alert is an alert that has been evaluated by the agent and followed by a complete message. A 
"conditional" alert is an alert that has not been sent to the evaluation agent, as it is dependent 
on another agent's evaluation of the alert. Alerts labeled "available" are those ready for 
processing by the evaluation agent and are the only types of alerts that can be placed on the 
agent's list of alerts. Table 4.3 summarizes the alert states. 
The alert state diagram is presented in figure 4.2. State Sj transitions to ,S\ the 
conditional state, when an evaluation agent has dependencies on one or more evaluation 
agents. If the agent is independent the state transitions to S3, the available state. The state 
transitions to state S4 after the alert is sent to the evaluation agent in a next message. The alert 
transitions to state S5 following a complete message from the evaluation agent. 
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Table 4.3. Alert state descriptions 
Alert State Description 
in progress The alert has been sent in a next response to an evaluation 
agent for processing 
The evaluation agent has signaled that the alert has been 
processed by sending a complete message 
conditional The alert cannot be sent to the evaluation agent as an agent 
dependency exists for the alert 
available The alert has no outstanding dependencies and is available 
for processing by the agent sending a next message 
States 
S,: initial state; x=l, agent has 
dependencies; x=0, agent is independent 
S2: alert is conditional 
S3: alert is available 
S4: alert is in progress 
S5: alert is complete 
Transitions 
t|: Dependencies satisfied 
t2: Alert sent to evaluation agent 
t3: complete message received 
Figure 4.2. Alert state diagram 
As individual alerts have a state associated with each evaluation agent, an alert can 
exist in multiple states. The broker uses this information to build agent dependencies. For 
example, an evaluation agent A that depends on evaluation agent B will have its alert states 
set to "conditional" when they are initialized in the alert database. As B sends complete 
messages for alerts it has processed, the corresponding entries in A are changed from 
"conditional" to "available", indicating that they can now be processed by A. Determining 
the conditions of agent dependencies is a key function of the broker and is dependent on its 
implementation. 
As discussed in section 4.2.2, there are three types of information messages, which are 
shown in table 4.2. The general information message contains free-text information or data 
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to be associated with the alert identified in the message. The broker stores this information in 
the alert database. 
The assertion information message is sent by an alert verification agent to indicate the 
validity of an alert. The scalar value returned to the broker is stored in an entry in the alert 
database for the agent's evaluation of the alert identified in the message. The alert state is 
updated to "processed" to indicate that the alert agent's evaluation is complete. 
The event information message is sent by an event correlation agent to associate events 
with the alert identified in the message. One or more events can be sent in a single event 
message depending on implementation. 
Tastly, the complete message is sent by an evaluation agent after it has finished 
processing the alert. The alert broker updates the state of the alert identified in the message 
from "in progress" to "processed". This information can be used in defining agent 
dependencies to allow dependent agents to process the alert once it is completed. 
4.3. Implementation 
This section describes the implementation of the alert verification and event correlation 
framework developed at LANL. Section 4.3.1 provides a general overview of the system. 
Section 4.3.2 discusses alert state. Section 4.3.3 presents the alert dependency 
implementation. Sections 4.3.4, 4.3.5 and 4.3.6 describe example evaluation agents 
developed for specific operational tasks at LANL. Appendix C provides a summary of 
relations used in the implementation. 
4.3.1. Overview 
The alert verification and event correlation framework has been implemented as a 
prototype system for LANL's network security team. The alert agents, alert broker and 
evaluation agents are written in Java, although they can be written in any language as the use 
of web services makes implementation language independent. The alert broker handles the 
web service messaging and is a servlet deployed using Apache Tomcat. The broker also 
maintains the alert database, which is a MySQL database on the broker's server. 
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Agents communicate with the web service by sending HTTP requests to the server 
specifying an agent identifier, message type and message content as parameters. The system 
is deployed on a closed, protected network, alleviating the need for authentication in the 
prototype although future implementations will include this capability. Sending messages 
over HTTP S or digitally signing messages are possible solutions to provide authentication in 
environments where trust cannot be assumed in the deployment. 
The broker's reply is returned in the HTTP response as text. Each line of the response 
is of the form "name, value" where the fields represent the parameter's name and value. This 
response format is adequate, as the responses sent by the broker are straightforward. Future 
versions of our implementation will utilize web service standards like SOAP to allow for 
more powerful messaging capabilities. 
Alert agents have been developed for TippingPoint IPS alerts, Snort IDS alerts and 
Estimated Moving Average Anomaly Detector (EMAAD) ADS alerts. Snort and 
TippingPoint are used in many network security environments. EMAAD is a proprietary 
anomaly detector developed at LANL to monitor hosts for anomalies using network flow 
records. 
While a single alert broker instance can manage alerts from the three IDSs 
simultaneously, our prototype deployment uses multiple broker instances to manage Snort 
alert and EMAAD alerts separately. A third instance has been deployed to store all three alert 
types using the same broker. The reason for creating multiple broker instances is to allow 
various sets of evaluation agents to be designed, implemented and tested using the different 
configurations. The three instances use the same code base and differ only in the alert types 
stored in the alert database and the types of evaluation agents managed by each broker. 
Information content returned to the broker in a general information message is stored in 
a general information relation as it was sent in the HTTP request. Correlated events are 
returned to the broker as XML and stored in a correlated events relation. Replacement of all 
standard HTML characters with their meta-character equivalents is necessary prior to 
insertion in the database (e.g. "<" is replaced with "%lt;"). 
Alert information is stored in four relations: a universal alert relation and a type-
specific alert relation for each of the three supported IDSs. The universal alert relation stores 
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miscellaneous information about the alert used by the broker in processing and the type-
specific relation stores the alert content. A unique alert identifier is the primary key across 
the four relations and is used when performing joins between the universal alert pool and the 
type-specific alert pools. An agent identifier is also stored to map the universal alert entry to 
the type-specific alert entry. 
For each evaluation agent, the broker creates a record in an alert status relation for 
every alert. This record is a quadruple of alert identifier, evaluation agent identifier, a 
floating-point evaluation value and a state value. The evaluation value is the result of an 
assertion message from the corresponding evaluation agent for the given alert identifier. In 
the prototype, a value of 1.0 indicates a valid alert and a value of -1.0 indicates an invalid 
alert. A value of zero implies that the evaluation agent did not have enough information to 
validate or invalidate the alert. A null evaluation value implies that an agent has not yet 
processed the alert. 
The alert status relation requires one entry for each alert for every agent deployed in 
the framework. If there are n alerts and m agents then there are n'm entries in the alert status 
relation. Although this relation can become very large, the simple design and query power of 
the relation's structure make it the preferred storage method in our implementation. 
4.3.2. Alert state 
Alert state is stored in the state value of the alert status relation as shown in table 4.4. 
The default value of an alert state is "available" unless the agent is dependent on other 
agents, in which case the default state is "conditional". The broker will change the state entry 
from "conditional" to "available" when all of the agent's dependencies have been met for the 
alert. The broker sets the state to "in progress" when a next message is sent by the evaluation 
agent and returned successfully to the agent. The state is changed from "in progress" to 
"processed" when the broker receives the complete message for this alert from the evaluation 
agent. 
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Table 4.4. Alert state values 
Value Alert State 
1 m ^ /"ogress 
2 proc&Mgùf 
3 conditional 
4 available 
4.3.3. Agent dependencies 
Agent dependencies are stored in a dependency relation that maps an agent, or the 
dependent agent, to the agent on which it depends, or the parent agent. The relation also 
stores the dependency condition as shown in table 4.5. The dependent agent can have 
multiple parent agents and can also be a parent agent so long as the mapping remains acyclic, 
forming a dependency tree. Agents without entries in the dependency relation both as the 
dependent agent and the parent agent are autonomous. 
Table 4.5. Alert dependency conditions 
Value Condition 
1 Evaluation > 0 
2 Evaluation < 0 
When an alert state is changed from "in progress" to "processed" as the results of the 
complete message, the alert broker determines if the completion of the alert has caused any 
dependencies to be satisfied. The broker first determines which agents depend on the agent 
that sent the complete message. Then for each dependent agent, the broker checks that all the 
dependencies have been satisfied. If so, the broker changes the state from "conditional" to 
"available" to allow dependent agents to process the alert. 
Through the use of dependencies, the broker provides hierarchical processing 
capabilities. When an evaluation sends a next request, the broker queries the alert database to 
determine the next alert to process. To generate the list of alerts ready for processing, the 
alert broker selects all records in the alert status relation with a state value of "available". The 
list is ordered by descending alert timestamp in our implementation. This ordering has the 
potential for starvation under heavy load if the evaluation agents cannot keep up with the 
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number of incoming alerts. The benefit of this ordering is that it favors newer alerts, making 
the system timelier. 
4.3.4. EMMAD alert verification 
The EMAAD IDS developed and used by LANL's network security team detects 
unusual network activity patterns from network flow records by comparing average host 
activity to current activity patterns. An alert is generated when the level of anomalous 
activity exceeds a threshold. The system is used extensively by security analysts and has 
proven to be highly useful in practice. 
After several months of use, a set of anomalies were identified that triggered because 
of hosts occasionally running printer discover applications. These applications search for 
printers on the internal network by scanning with port 161 UDP traffic in the network flow 
data. This traffic pattern is known to be benign, but is still anomalous by definition in 
EMAAD. 
Instead of making changes to EMAAD, an alert verification agent was attached to the 
prototype EMAAD alert broker to check for large occurrences of port 161 UDP traffic in a 
short period of time. If the number of port 161 UDP flow records exceeds a threshold at the 
time of an alert, the agent sends an assertion message with a value of-1.0 indicating that the 
alert is a false positive. If a large number of 161 UDP records are not found, a value of 1.0 is 
returned to indicate a valid alert. The zero value is returned if the log files are not available, 
which can occur because processing delays. 
This approach is preferable to making changes to the EMAAD system as there is a 
possibility that an attacker could use knowledge of the agent's design to scan the LANL 
network on port UDP port 161. By changing EMAAD to ignore this activity, it would be 
blind to all such attacks in the future. The agent-based approach allows users to filter out 161 
UDP scans generated by EMAAD but analysts can still audit this activity when necessary. 
Also, the agent-based approach is useful for threshold tuning. The agent's threshold defining 
what constitutes a port 161 UDP scan is very subjective. By tuning the threshold using an 
agent, a value can be selected without losing alerts. When changing the threshold, the agent 
simply re-processes all the alerts to test the new threshold setting. 
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A web interface was developed to allow security analysts to view alerts in the EMAAD 
alert broker's database. The interface's default operation displays alerts that have a value of 
1.0 for the alert verification agent, thus filtering out known false positives. The analyst can 
also view alerts with values of zero or -1.0 if needed. 
4.3.5. Snort alert verification 
Application-level TCP/IP attacks require a fully established connection between the 
attacker and the target hosts. Establishing a connection requires a three-way handshake 
consisting of three packets. Additionally, the attack packet must be sent requiring at least one 
additional packet. By locating a network connection event between the source and 
destination IP addresses over the port combination in the Snort alert, it can be determined 
whether or not a successful connection was established. The absence of a successful 
connection indicates that something (e.g. a firewall or IPS) prevented the attack from 
occurring, even though Snort detected the attack packet due to its placement on network. 
To verify that a successful connection was established for TCP alerts, an alert 
verification and event correlation agent was attached to the Snort alert. The agent first 
correlates network connection records generated by LANL's proprietary NetHead IDS to the 
Snort alert. If a TCP connection record with more than three packets is located spanning the 
timestamp of the alert and matching the source and destination IP and source and destination 
ports, an assertion message with an evaluation value of 1.0 is returned indicating that a 
successful connection was established. The correlated event is also returned as XML in an 
event message to provide the analyst with additional information. If no record exists 
matching the above criteria, a value of -1.0 is returned indicating that no connection was 
established between the hosts. A value of zero is returned if the alert is not for a TCP attack 
or if the network connection logs are unavailable for the necessary time period, a possible 
occurrence due to unreliable data. 
As with the EMAAD alert broker, a web interface has been implemented to display 
Snort alerts that have been validated by the evaluation agent. The interface displays the Snort 
alert information along with the correlated NetHead event, providing the user with additional 
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information. Security analysts also have the ability to display invalidated or unprocessed 
alerts. 
4.3.6. Multi-paradigm event correlation 
To analyze an IDS alert, a security analyst requires information from additional data 
sources to correctly make a determination of the alert's importance. We deployed several 
event correlation agents within our prototype framework to automate the task of event 
correlation. Additionally, we utilize correlated events in our research on multi-paradigm alert 
correlation described in chapter 5. Correlated events are transformed into feature vectors that 
represent an abstract "fingerprint" of a host at the time of the alert. By performing correlation 
using the correlated events, alerts from multiple IDS sensors and paradigms can be 
correlated. The event correlation framework assists in the first phase of the correlation 
process, by automating the correlation of events from multiple heterogeneous datasets. 
Individual agents were designed to correlate events from Snort, TippingPoint and 
NetHead. For each type, a time window spanning the alert timestamp is defined as shown in 
table 4.6. The search criteria used to locate correlated events is the IP address of the host on 
the internal network and the timestamp within the time window and is selected as it is 
common to the three alert types that are supported by the prototype system: Snort, EMAAD 
and TippingPoint. More complex event correlation agents can be constructed, however this 
information is of highest importance to our work on multi-paradigm alert correlation. 
Table 4.6. Event correlation time windows 
Type Window (hours) 
Snort 
TippingPoint 
NetHead 
24 
12 
A web interface was created for security analysts to view alerts from EMAAD, Snort 
and TippingPoint along with correlated events. Without the event correlation framework, 
analysts must perform the correlation operations by hand, often executing multiple queries 
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over multiple interfaces. The framework is used to automate these common tasks, making the 
analyst more effective and efficient in detecting and responding to intrusions. 
4.4. Summary 
To summarize, we present a framework for alert verification and event correlation that 
addresses limitations in prior work in alert correlation, most notably ease of deployment, 
flexibility and scalability. The framework is easy to deploy due to its use of autonomous 
agents and web services for communication between elements of the system. The system is 
scalable in that agents can be run asynchronously on multiple hosts. Our framework 
contributes to the IDS research by addressing these issues and enabling future research in the 
area of alert correlation. 
Additionally, we describe the prototype implementation of the framework and several 
agents implemented to perform alert verification and event correlation at LANL. The 
prototype implementation supports alerts from three IDSs from varying paradigms. This 
shows the flexibility of our framework in practice. The system is also distributed and uses 
HTTP for communication, allowing the framework to be deployed in a variety of network 
environments. 
The multi-paradigm event correlation agent implementation is utilized in chapter 5 to 
facilitate the prototype multi-paradigm alert correlation algorithm implementation. The event 
correlation agents are used to gather log records that are converted into feature vectors used 
in the correlation algorithm. By leveraging the event correlation framework and the web 
service framework for the alert correlation approach in the following chapter, we continue to 
build upon the concepts presented so far in this dissertation. 
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5. Multi-Paradigm Alert Correlation 
To monitor and protect networks from evolving threats, network security 
administrators deploy multiple types of intrusion detection systems. Alert correlation is 
needed to group related alerts to reduce the number of individual alerts and discover 
relationships amongst alerts. Current approaches to alert correlation require a normalization 
phase prior to correlation to map alerts into a common representation and cannot easily be 
generalized to correlate alerts from disparate detection paradigms. 
To overcome this problem, we present a generalized, multi-paradigm alert correlation 
approach using feature vectors derived from network log datasets. This differs from current 
approaches that correlate alerts using fields in the alert schema or a set of expert rules. 
Domain experts evaluated our prototype implementation using unlabeled data and 
alerts collected from the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) network. Initial results 
show that our system outperformed a control algorithm that correlates alerts using fields in 
the Snort schema. 
5.1. Introduction 
Network attacks continue to evolve in complexity, necessitating the deployment of 
multiple types of intrusion detection and prevention systems. Deploying a lone signature-
based intrusion detection system (IDS) is no longer adequate for most network environments. 
Anomaly detection systems (ADSs) are needed to detect unknown attacks. Intrusion 
prevention systems (IPSs) are capable of defending against threats by taking action such as 
terminating a network connection. As organizations add systems to monitor and protect their 
networks and host systems, alert correlation techniques are required to discover relationships 
between sensors and detect sophisticated multi-step, distributed attacks. 
Alert correlation techniques are used to streamline network and computer security 
analysis workflows by decreasing the number of alerts presented to the user and provide 
insight into complex network attacks. Low-level, or elementary, alerts are grouped together 
into clusters of related alerts. For instance a host scanning the Internet may generate 
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thousands of elementary alerts that can be correlated and presented to the user as a single 
event. Alert correlation techniques assist analysts by providing lower numbers of alerts and 
discovering patterns in the data that would otherwise go unnoticed. 
Correlating amongst IDSs is difficult in that translation of the alert data into a unified 
schema is required. This process, known as correlation, is the first step of many current alert 
correlation techniques. Prior to correlation, alerts from heterogeneous sensors are mapped to 
a common schema expected by the correlation algorithm. In practice, normalization is 
challenging due to resource constraints and incomplete or missing information. More 
importantly, techniques relying on normalization do not allow for correlation between 
disparate detection paradigms. Correlating alerts amongst differing paradigms is a challenge 
for current techniques as they rely on the greatest common denominator of overlapping fields 
to perform correlation. This is typically a small number of fields, in some cases simply an IP 
address and a timestamp, timestamp as with many host-centric anomaly detection systems. 
With the limited amount of information provided in the alert schema, it is difficult to perform 
interesting or useful correlation when dealing with alerts from differing paradigms. 
The majority of alert correlation research projects, open source projects and 
commercial applications, including expensive, complex security information management 
(SIM) solutions, rely extensively on expert rules and heuristics to perform alert correlation. 
This becomes a burden on analysts who must constantly develop and tune correlation rules to 
ensure accuracy. Maintaining this rule set requires deep domain knowledge and is susceptible 
to human error. 
To overcome the drawbacks and limitations in current alert correlation techniques, we 
propose an approach that uses network and system log data along with IDS alerts to build a 
generalized alert profile that is used to correlate alerts from multiple IDS paradigms. We 
consider events to be records from information sources deemed relevant to an individual IDS 
alert. 
Our approach involves building a statistical fingerprint for each IDS alert from network 
logs related to the internal, protected host at the time of the alert. A feature vector is built 
with features encoded as histograms and similarity between alerts is computed by comparing 
the distances between histograms. Similar alerts are placed in clusters that represent an 
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abstract correlation between the clustered alerts' network activity profiles. Using this 
technique, alerts from multiple IDS, IPS and ADS sensors can be correlated without the need 
of normalization, the use of an alert ontology or expert rules. Additionally, our approach does 
not temporally constrain the correlation process, allowing for long-term trend analysis and 
knowledge discovery. Although our current focus is on network datasets, our approach can 
be generalized to support data from host-based tools. 
To evaluate our technique, we implemented a prototype offline correlation system and 
generated Snort alert correlation results from non-overlapping, independent one-month and 
six-month datasets. Security analysts at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) evaluated 
the one-month dataset. The domain experts were asked to compare the correlation of our 
technique to that of a control group, which performed correlation by grouping alerts by fields 
in the alert schema. In our test, the experts preferred our technique to the control group, 
showing that our generalized correlation technique produces results that are better than an 
algorithm that groups alerts using the alert schema, as typically done in practice. 
Additionally, the experts showed a preference towards correlation results utilizing network 
log data in addition to the information in the alert data set. This shows that adding suitable 
log data yields improved results, an important factor in expanding our prototype in future 
study to incorporate additional alert databases for correlation. Lastly, we explore the average 
entropy of alert clusters in relation to the number of clusters generated by the clustering 
algorithm and use this metric to tune our results. 
5.2. Alert Profile Construction 
To begin the alert correlation process, related network log records, referred to as 
events, are gathered for each alert in the database. These events are used to construct feature 
vectors in the second phase of the process. Defining how events are related to a particular 
alert is challenging and is dependent on domain knowledge and available datasets. This is a 
critical aspect of the design and implementation of the system. 
For our prototype, events are gathered from three datasets: Snort alerts, TippingPoint 
block logs and network connection records from proprietary LANL software known as 
NetFIead. These three datasets are related in that they monitor network traffic and do so in 
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the same location on the LANL network as shown in figure 5.1. The TippingPoint sensor is 
an inline IPS while Snort and NetHead passively monitor for malicious activity via optical 
network taps. TippingPoint and Snort generate alert records and NetHead records network 
flow records. 
Internet 
— N e t w o r k  f l o w  
# Network tap 
LANL 
Incoming 
Incoming 
Tipping 
Point 
Snort Nethead 
Outgoing 
Figure 5.1. IDS sensor placement 
These datasets were chosen for use in our prototype largely due to overlapping fields in 
the event records. Other datasets were considered but were ruled out as being noisy or 
insignificant. In hindsight, the TippingPoint data proved to be insignificant in that only 2000 
related records were found out of a total of one million correlated events. In our future work 
we plan to develop techniques to guide selection of suitable datasets. 
The three chosen datasets contain information on IP protocol, source and destination IP 
addresses and source and destination ports. This overlap is desirable, although not necessary, 
when building feature vectors in the second step of the correlation process. These fields are 
common to many network logs and IDS alert schémas and provide an ideal "common 
ground" for generating network traffic profiles of related events. 
To identify events related to a given alert, the internal IP address and the detection 
timestamp of the alert are used to determine the search criteria. It is reasonable to assume that 
these fields will be available for any type of IDS system, including host-based systems. 
Given the placement of the sensors used in our prototype, each log record contains a single 
internal IP address and a single external IP address. This limits the detection view of our 
system to internal-to-external and external-to-internal network traffic patterns. 
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After establishing the search criteria for related events, the logs pertaining to the 
internal IP address are gathered for a time period related to the detection timestamp. A time 
window is established for each data set, depending on volume. Large datasets required a 
smaller window due to resource constraints in our test environment, although this can be 
reexamined in a production environment. Table 5.1 shows the data set volumes and 
corresponding window sizes for each type. 
Table 5.1. Alert profile datasets 
Type Volume Window 
Snort 100+/day 24 hours 
TippingPoint 1000+/day 12 hours 
NetHead 3,000,000+/day 1 hour 
For the time window, records that contained the internal IP address in the source or 
destination address field were stored in a relational database. The resulting records represent 
a profile of the network activity of the internal host before and after the alert. Ultimately, 
correlation results are dependent on the accuracy, reliability and information value of the log 
files used to construct the alert profile. 
5.3. Feature Vector Generation 
After building an alert profile, the information in the logs is abstracted into a feature 
vector that is used to perform correlation amongst alerts. The feature vector is used in the 
correlation phase as a "fingerprint" for the alert based on the network activity related to the 
alert. Each field in the feature vector is a histogram of network traffic information. Appendix 
D describes each feature in detail. The choice of fields is dependent on domain knowledge 
and available datasets as in profile construction. For instance, in our prototype the only time 
related feature is a duration histogram. An additional time feature can be added to 
incorporate time of day information into the feature vector with categories representing the 
hour of the day the events occurred. This feature would add a temporal dimension to the 
correlation results. 
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To illustrate an example of histogram computation, consider the log information for 
internal host 10.0.0.1 presented in table 5.2. Upon initialization, each feature contains a 
histogram with bin values of zero. For each related event, the bin count is incremented when 
a field value falls within the bin category or range. In this case, a protocol histogram with 
bins for "TCP", "UDP" and "ICMP" is encoded as [ 3, 1, 0], A duration feature with bins for 
"short", "medium" and "long" can be encoded as [2, 1,1]. The logs presented in table 5.3 
differ considerably and are encoded [0,0,3] for protocol and [3, 0,0] for duration. 
Table 5.2. Logs for alert 1 with internal IP 10.0.0.1 
Source IP:Port Destination IP:Port Protocol Duration 
10.0.0.1:3576 1.2.3.4:8080 TCP 2 
10.0.0.1:161 9.8.7.6:161 UDP 0 
1.2.3.4:1234 10.0.0.1:443 TCP 0 
1.2.3.4:2233 10.0.0.1:22 TCP 1000 
Table 5.3. Logs for alert 2 with internal IP 10.0.0.2 
Source IP:Port Destination IP:Port Protocol Duration 
10.0.0.2:0 192.168.1.1:0 ICMP 0 
10.0.0.2:0 192.168.1.2:0 ICMP 0 
10.0.0.2:0 192.168.1.3:0 ICMP 0 
The use of histograms highlights the differences in the example alert profiles, but the 
histograms must be scaled to account for log volume before they can be compared in the 
correlation phase. A count is kept for each feature and incremented whenever a bin value is 
incremented. Not every log will contain the fields relevant to a feature and are ignored in the 
context of the missing field, but still considered for other applicable features. For instance, 
bytes values are used to generate the vector in our prototype but Snort and TippingPoint are 
packet-based systems and therefore do not have information on byte counts in their logs. 
After processing all the correlated events, each bin count is divided by the total number 
of log records yielding a value between 0.0 and 1.0. In the above example, the first protocol 
encoding is scaled to [ 0.75, 0.25, 0.00 ] and the second protocol encoding is scaled to [ 0.00, 
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0.00, 1.00 ]. Table 5.4 shows the histogram representations of the protocol and duration 
features for alerts 1 and 2. 
Table 5.4. Histogram examples 
The final step in the process is to compute similarity between feature vectors to 
correlate alerts with similar network traffic signatures. A number of statistical or data mining 
techniques can be used to compute similarity and correlate feature vectors. However as a 
proof of concept, a simple distance measure is used in our prototype to compare histograms. 
Bray-Curtis distance [36], also known as Sorensen distance and widely used in Ecology, was 
selected as it is normalized making threshold selection easier than using a distance 
measurement like Euclidian distance, which requires that distances be scaled. A distance of 
0.0 indicates an exact match, with higher values indicating that the histograms are different. 
A distance of 1.0 indicates maximum dissimilarity. 
Alert Protocol Duration 
1 [0.75,0.25,0.00] 
2 [0.00, 0.00, 1.00] 
[ 0.50, 0.25, 0.25 ] 
[ 1.00,0.00, 0.00 1 
5.4. Correlation 
(1) 
/= 1 
^ d(Xi ,  Yi) x Wi (2) 
zxx,y)= — 
2»" 
/=i 
Bray-Curtis distance is computed as shown in equation (1) where d(A,B) is the distance 
between histograms A and B. Given the example data in table 5.4, the distance for the 
protocol histograms is 1.00 and 0.50 for the duration histograms. To compute the distance 
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between feature vectors X and Y, equation (2) is applied. In our prototype, each feature is 
weighted with a value of 1, giving an overall distance of 0.75 for the two alerts, showing that 
they are highly unrelated. 
The clustering algorithm shown in figure 5.2\ takes as input a minimum distance 
threshold, t, the set of alerts represented as feature vectors, K and an empty set of alert 
clusters, C. For each feature vector, the distance between all other vectors is computed. If 
there is an alert that is less than t from the alert, the two alerts are places in a cluster, the 
centroid is computed and the cluster is added to C. If there is more than one alert whose 
distance is less than t, the closest alert is chosen. If no vector in V is within t, the distance 
between the alert and all clusters in C is computed. The alert is added to the closest cluster 
with distance less than t from the alert. If no such cluster is found, the alert is removed from 
V and placed as a singleton cluster in C. This process continues until there are no alerts in the 
database. 
Let t be a value between 0.0 and 1.0 
Let V be the set of feature vectors 
Let C be the set of clusters, initially empty 
For feature vectors Vx in V, i <— 1 to size(V): 
For clusters Cx in C, j «- 1 to size(C): 
Compute D(Vi, Cj ) 
Find min distance less than t, if any, and add V± to Cj 
If Vi not clustered : 
For feature vectors in V, j i to size(V): 
Compute D(Vi, Vj ) 
Find min distance less than t, if any : 
Create new cluster c containing V±, Vj 
Add c to C 
Remove Vir Vj from V 
If Vi not clustered : 
Create new cluster c containing Vi? add to C 
Remove Vj. from V 
Figure 5.2. Clustering algorithm pseudocode 
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5.5. Results 
In our evaluation we show that adding suitable datasets to the correlation process 
results in improved results according to domain experts evaluating a random sample of alerts. 
We also show that our generalized technique is comparable in terms of user preference with 
techniques used in practice for correlating IDS alerts. These techniques correlate alerts 
according to features in the alert schema and cannot be generalized for multi-paradigm 
correlation without normalization. 
The evaluation dataset contains log records and IDS alerts collected on the LANL 
network. The dataset is unlabeled and therefore we cannot show accuracy in terms of false 
positive and false negative rates as typically presented in alert correlation research. Instead 
we rely on domain experts to evaluate a sample of Snort alerts. We feel these results, 
although subjective, are applicable to real-world environments because the data set was 
collected from a live network and evaluated by domain experts, unlike many results that are 
generated from small, artificial data. 
In our evaluation, security analysts from LANL were asked to compare correlation 
results from one month of Snort alerts correlated using four different approaches: a control 
group clustering on fields in the Snort alert schema and three instances of our algorithm with 
varying datasets used to generate feature vectors. For each Snort alert, correlated events were 
gathered from Snort, TippingPoint and NetHead to build the network traffic profile and 
feature vector. Next, a random sample of these alerts was selected for evaluation. The sample 
of alerts consisted of up to three alerts for each distinct signature for the month for a total of 
26 unique alerts. 
The domain experts were asked to rank each cluster containing the sampled alert on a 
scale of 1 to 10 for each of the four techniques, with low values indicating inaccurate or 
uninteresting clustering and high values indicating well-correlated or interesting results. For 
example, an alert for a web attack in a cluster of email alerts indicates that the web attack is 
poorly correlated. Conversely, a large cluster of similar web attacks would be of interest to 
the analyst. This metric was left to the analysts' discretion and expert knowledge. Analysts 
did not know which approach was used to generate the correlated clusters. 
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The first correlation technique, the control algorithm, clusters alerts in a relational 
database by using a series of relational GROUP BY operations. There are five iterations of 
the algorithm using the field values in table 5.5 to merge alerts into clusters. In each iteration, 
the set of distinct tuples matching the group by fields is computed along with a count of 
merged alerts in the tuple. If more than one alert is merged in the tuple, the matching alerts 
are placed in a new cluster and removed from the database. If not, the alert is left in the 
database for consideration in the next iteration. After all iterations are run, each alert 
remaining in the database is placed in a singleton cluster. 
Table 5.5. Fields used by control clustering algorithm 
Iteration Group By Fields 
1 Signature, Src IP, Dst IP, Src Port, Dst Port 
2 Signature, Src IP, Dst IP, Dst Port 
3 Signature, Src IP, Dst IP, Dst Port 
4 Signature, Src IP, Src Port, Dst Port 
5 Signature, Dst IP, Src Port, Dst Port 
Table 5.6. Evaluation algorithms 
Algorithm Description Datasets 
1 Control Snort 
2 Snort alerts only Snort 
3 IDS/IPS alerts Snort, TippingPoint 
4 All datasets Snort, TippingPoint, NetHead 
The three remaining techniques apply our approach with incremental input sources, as 
shown in table 5.6, used in generating the network activity profile. The similarity threshold 
used in this evaluation was 0.2. Our method for selecting this threshold value is presented in 
section 5.6. The evaluation results for the random sample of alerts show that algorithm 4 was 
the preferred technique according to the expert opinion of the analysts given the sample alerts 
and the available input datasets. Table 5.7 shows the average alert score and standard 
deviation for each algorithm. 
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Table 5.7. Domain expert evaluation results 
Algorithm Ave. Score Std. Deviation 
1 5.04 1.99 
2 4.56 1.70 
3 4.56 1.90 
4 5.57 1.65 
These results support our claim that the generalized algorithm using multiple datasets 
competes with approaches clustering on fields in the alert schema. Furthermore, the control 
group results generated 4476 clusters over a six-month period, which included the time 
period of the sampled alerts, compared to only 931 clusters when using algorithm 4 with a 
threshold of 0.2. This shows considerable reduction in the number clusters presented to the 
analysts while at the same time providing interesting clustering of the sampled alerts. 
Also, among the three algorithms using the generalized technique, the algorithm 
building the feature vectors with all three datasets was preferred over the others. This 
supports our claim that adding suitable data in the alert profile generation phase will result in 
improved correlation. It was also apparent that the small TippingPoint dataset did not have a 
noticeable impact on the overall results. A similar evaluation can be used in practice to 
determine if a dataset should be included in alert profile construction. In this case, the results 
show that the correlated TippingPoint events can be removed from the alert profiles. 
The argument can be made that correlating events using multiple data sources can 
introduce information into the correlation process that leads to inaccurate or misleading 
results. By incrementally selecting datasets as shown in table 6, we show that adding more 
event records resulted in improved correlation according to the preferences of our domain 
experts. 
5.6. Threshold Tuning 
When evaluating the domain expert's cluster rankings, it became apparent that the 
amount of entropy in the clustered Snort alerts was related to the expert's rankings. Clusters 
with low entropy equate to high rankings while clusters with high entropy equate to low 
rankings. This observation is used to tune the clustering algorithm similarity threshold. If the 
83 
threshold is low, there are too many clusters for the analysts to examine. If the threshold is 
high, there are fewer clusters but the entropy increases, making analysis difficult. 
To tune the threshold, the clustering algorithm is run with similarity thresholds ranging 
between 0.0 and 0.5 in increments of 0.05. For each increment, the cluster entropy is 
computed for each cluster and the average is calculated. 
N M, 
entropy(C) = ^ -1 * ^ pj log 2pj 
/= 1 7=1 
(3) 
Equation 3 calculates the entropy of cluster C where N is the number of features. Mi is 
the number of distinct items for feature / and p, is the probability that feature z's value is 
found in cluster C. For each cluster of Snort alerts, entropy is calculated and summed for 
five features: source and destination IP, source and destination port and signature name. 
The cluster size and cluster entropy from six months of network data is shown in 
figures 5.3 and 5.4. The ideal thresholds fall in the shaded regions where entropy and cluster 
volume are low. The shaded boxes and the values in table 5.8 represent the acceptable 
similarity threshold values for the evaluation data set given the resources at LANL. If the 
threshold is lowered, there are too many clusters to be analyzed each day. If the threshold is 
raised, the entropy values become high, indicating noisy clusters. The ideal threshold to 
select is one that has the lowest overall entropy that can be managed given the personnel 
resources dedicated to analysis of the data. 
Table 5.8. Selected similarity thresholds 
Threshold # Clusters Clusters/day Ave. Entropy 
0.15 1187 7 0.27 
0.20 734 4 0.38 
0.25 423 2 0.57 
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Number of Clusters vs. Similarity 
3000 
2500 
• 
0 0,05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0,25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0,5 
Similarity Threshold 
Figure 5.3. Cluster volume related to the similarity threshold 
Cluster Entropy vs. Similarity Threshold 
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 
Similarity Threshold 
Figure 5.4. Average cluster entropy related to similarity threshold 
5.7. Discussion 
Several interesting results were discovered in evaluating a second result set of six 
months of Snort alerts and correlated events. The signature database contained a combination 
of published and custom Snort rules. Several of the signatures are now deprecated because of 
high false positive rates. In one case a rule looking for the string "nc%20", meant to detect 
remote NetCat execution, was known to trigger false positives regularly on a web server 
hosting the periodic table of the elements. When the page was viewed the rule triggered 
because the element "zinc" appeared in the page followed by the "%20" HTML encoding for 
85 
a space character. In the correlation results, alerts from this web server are grouped together 
in a large cluster that included alerts spanning the six-month time period. Alerts in this 
cluster differentiate themselves from other alert instances matching the signature due to the 
unique traffic pattern generated by the web server. 
Another interesting example involved a custom rule looking for a byte sequence 
associated with a known rootkit. The rule triggered consistently on web servers downloading 
JPEG images that contained the byte sequence by chance. However, one particular set of 
correlated alerts was generated from a single internal host over a period of ten minutes. This 
cluster was very different from the normal pattern and showed that our approach is capable 
of finding patterns that otherwise go unnoticed. 
This signature is also of interest in that the name of the rule changed at a point in time 
late in the six-month period. In many instances, alerts with both signature names were 
grouped in clusters. This illustrates the correlation algorithm's ability to group alerts without 
the need of normalization. The traffic patterns of these alert instances were the same, so they 
were correlated regardless of signature name. 
Although this evidence is anecdotal, our observations show that our alert correlation 
technique is a useful tool for data exploration. Interesting patterns and trends are discovered 
that would otherwise go unnoticed. 
5.8. Summary 
In summary, we present an alert correlation technique that is applicable to multiple 
intrusion detection paradigms. Our correlation approach is dependent on network events 
related to IDS alerts, not the features in the alert schema. By making our correlation criteria 
independent of the alert schema our approach can be applied to alerts from any number of 
IDSs. Another benefit of this approach is that it does not rely on an alert ontology or 
normalization to correlate alerts. We feel this to be an important contribution as 
normalization and maintenance of an alert ontology are resource intensive tasks in real-world 
environments where multiple IDS, IPS and ADS sensors are deployed. 
Another contribution of this work is its evaluation and tuning using live data from the 
LANL network. We show through domain experts that our technique provides interesting 
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and useful results compared to the available alternatives. We also show that in our evaluation 
of real-world data that more input datasets result in improved correlation results, according to 
the domain experts. Lastly, we provide guidelines for threshold tuning by weighing cluster 
volume against cluster entropy. These results are important in that the techniques utilized in 
evaluation and tuning can be utilized by organizations when to deploying an alert correlation 
system following our approach. 
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6. A Multiple Criteria Hill Climbing Algorithm for Alert Correlation 
Feature Selection 
Feature selection is a common data-mining technique used to reduce the feature space 
of high-dimensional datasets. Typically, feature selection algorithms required labeled 
datasets to determine accuracy. As labeled networking and intrusion detection systems data is 
difficult to obtain in real world environments, applying feature selection is difficult in 
practice. 
To address this problem, we present a feature selection for correlation of intrusion 
detection system (IDS) alerts that is optimized to run in production environments where 
labeled data is not available. Our approach locally optimizes a set of features using hill 
climbing based on any number of user-defined evaluation criteria. In our prototype, we use 
cluster entropy and cluster volume to optimize a feature set developed in our prior work on 
multi-paradigm alert correlation. 
6.1. Introduction 
Feature selection is a common step in many data-mining problems where it is desirable 
to compare the results of various feature sets to optimize results. Feature selection is 
important for high-dimensional datasets where performance of the data-mining algorithm is a 
critical factor. Reducing the number of feature is important in this case to optimize execution 
time. Feature selection is also used to increase the number of features. This is done to 
improve the accuracy of the algorithm by considering features not initially used in testing the 
data-mining algorithm. 
Applying feature selection to IDS alert correlation is an interesting but difficult 
problem when working with real-world datasets. Feature selection techniques assume that the 
input dataset is labeled for classification. In the case of intrusion detection systems this is 
typically a label of "intrusive" or "normal". The feature selection algorithm then reports its 
classification accuracy [19]. In cases where only unlabeled datasets are available, such as 
production environments and large test networks, feature selection cannot be applied in this 
way, as each alert requires to be labeled with a classification. This process is time consuming 
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and prone to human error as it relies on domain experts to apply labels. An alternative is to 
establish new evaluation criteria that can be applied to real-world, unlabeled datasets to 
perform alert correlation feature selection. 
We present an efficient feature selection algorithm for alert correlation that is designed 
for use in production environments where labeled data is not available, although our 
approach is applicable to datasets with labeled data as well. The algorithm present in this 
dissertation selects features based on the overall performance of one or more user-defined, 
weighted evaluation criteria. In executing the algorithm, an initial, or candidate, set of 
features is defined from a set of available features. An alert correlation algorithm is then run 
with the candidate features to establish a baseline for comparison in feature selection. 
Feature selection begins with reverse feature selection, where features are removed 
from the candidate feature set one at a time and the correlation algorithm is applied to each 
reduced feature set. This process continues until the correlation results stop improving 
relative to the baseline performance of the candidate feature set. Next, forward feature 
selection is applied to the potentially reduced feature set. In this phase, features omitted from 
the candidate feature set are added one at a time from the larger set of features. Like in 
reverse feature selection, this process continues until the performance stops improving. 
Our algorithm is efficient in that it continues feature selection only as long as the 
overall performance improves. We use a hill-climbing approach to optimize the feature set 
based on the candidate feature set as a starting point. This dramatically limits the feature 
space by only exploring paths with improved results making the algorithm ideal for 
production environments where tuning of correlation algorithms must be performed 
periodically and quickly. 
In our prior work on multi-paradigm alert correlation, we showed that there is a 
tradeoff between the number of clusters and average cluster entropy when tuning our 
similarity threshold. We used these properties as evaluation criteria to tune the feature set in 
our alert correlation implementation described chapter 5. Results from executing our feature 
selection algorithm on our test data shows that our candidate feature set showed improved 
performance when a single feature was removed. 
In this work we provide three contributions: 
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1) Evaluation criteria for comparing alert correlation results using cluster volume and 
per-cluster entropy. 
2) An efficient hill-climbing algorithm for alert correlation feature selection suitable 
for production environments. 
3) Performance results from three feature sets considered for use in our research on 
multi-paradigm alert correlation. 
The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 6.2 reviews our prior work on 
multi-paradigm alert correlation. Section 6.3 and its sub-sections describe the feature 
selection algorithm. Section 6.4 presents the results of applying our feature selection 
algorithm to three feature sets using our multi-paradigm alert correlation algorithm and 
section 5 summarizes the chapter. 
6.2. Multi-Paradigm Alert Correlation 
In our prior work we defined a multi-paradigm approach to IDS alert correlation that 
correlates alerts using network traffic profiles instead of fields in the alert schema or expert 
rules as is commonly done in practice. For each alert, related logs, called correlated events, 
are gathered matching the internal host associated with the alert at the time of the alert. These 
events are used to construct a network traffic profile of the internal host before and after the 
alert occurred. The logs are transformed into feature vectors of network features like IP 
addresses, ports, bytes counts, etc. These feature vectors are used to correlate IDS alerts by 
clustering alerts with a similarity function. 
In the evaluation of our results, it was apparent that a low number of clusters combined 
with low per-cluster entropy were desirable. Maintaining a low number of clusters is 
important in that security analysts require tools that do not inundate them with more 
information than they can handle. Maintaining low entropy is important in that clusters with 
high entropy have very little information value and therefore do not provide the analyst with 
meaningful correlation. 
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Given these criteria, we tuned our similarity threshold to find a point where there exist 
an acceptable number of clusters generated per day with low overall entropy. Analyst 
resources and an estimation of the number of clusters a full-time analyst could manage in a 
single day determined the number of acceptable clusters. We then selected thresholds based 
on this number where the entropy was the lowest. As we are using Bray-Curtis distance 
measures [36] for our similarity measure, threshold values ranged from 0.0 to 1.0. Threshold 
tuning was run in increments of 0.05 although more precise tuning can be performed if 
necessary. This experiment showed that thresholds values of 0.15, 0.20 and 0.25 provided 
acceptable results although for the purposes of this chapter, a threshold of 0.20 is used to 
show the results of feature selection. 
6.3. Feature Selection Algorithm 
This section details the feature selection algorithm. Sections 6.3.1, 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 
describe the evaluation, feature set comparison and feature selection algorithms respectively. 
Two functions are implementation dependent: the alert correlation algorithm and the 
evaluation algorithm. The alert correlation function is run by the evaluation function to build 
the correlated dataset. The evaluation function computes the evaluation criteria as defined by 
domain experts implementing the system. 
An explanation of variable names used in the following sections is provided in table 
6.1. Variables with uppercase letters are sets or arrays while lower case values are integers or 
scalars. 
Additional explanation of the feature set notations is necessary. We identify a set of all 
possible obvious and abstract features called Ftotai• Obvious features are those present as 
fields in the log records of our dataset. Examples of obvious features are the signature 
identifier and the source IP address of a Snort alert. Abstract features are those created by 
combining features to create a new feature, for example combining bytes transferred and 
duration from a network connection record to create a byte rate feature. 
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Table 6.1. Variables used in feature selection algorithm 
Variable Description 
F A set of features to be used when computing the Correlate and Evaluate function 
F' Intermediate feature sets created during forward and reverse feature selection 
Ftest A set of features to be considered for addition during forward feature selection 
Fan The set of all features defined for alert correlation 
E, Ei, E2 Arrays of scalars representing evaluation results 
v A scalar representing the performance of a feature set returned by the Compare 
function 
vmin A scalar used to store the lowest evaluation value found during feature selection 
Fmin Feature set that corresponds to vmin 
Emin Evaluation criteria results that correspond to vmm 
W A set of weights for each evaluation criteria whose sum is 1.0 
Due to the inclusion of abstract features, Ftota/ could be unbounded. Therefore a finite 
set of features, Faiu is selected from Ftotai by the domain experts to be considered during 
feature selection. The selection of features for Faii is dependent on the design and 
implementation of the correlation algorithm. For instance, features common to a variety of 
network security datasets were included to make our approach IDS independent. IDS specific 
features like a signature identifier were omitted because they restricted our technique to a 
particular IDS. 
As Faii is a potentially large number of features, some of which may not be relevant, a 
candidate set of features, F, is chosen from Fau, again relying on domain expertise in network 
security to select features. For example, in our candidate feature set, the feature "time of day" 
is omitted, even though this was an obvious feature in our dataset. 
Three additional feature sets are described in table 6.1. The feature set Ftest is used 
during forward feature selection to evaluate the performance of features in Faii that were not 
included in the candidate feature set, F. The feature set F' is used by the reverse and forward 
feature selection phases to store intermediate feature sets. Lastly, Fmin is used to track the 
optimally performing feature set during the feature selection process. This feature set is 
outputted upon completion of execution. 
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6.3.1. Evaluation criteria 
A key aspect of our feature selection approach is the selection of evaluation criteria. As 
shown in the following section, our algorithm allows for any number of weighted criteria to 
be considered during feature selection. Since our focus is on real-world datasets, no labeled 
data is available and therefore it is impossible to obtain results in terms classification 
accuracy. This necessitates the creation of alternative evaluation criteria to compare results 
during feature selection. 
The Evaluate function computes the performance of a feature set based on the defined 
evaluation criteria and returns an array with an entry for each evaluation criteria. Choosing 
evaluation features is implementation dependent, although in our prior work we determined 
that the number of clusters and the per-cluster entropy of clusters are good indicators of alert 
correlation performance. Therefore, we define two factors, equally weighted in our 
implementation, to guide feature selection: the average cluster entropy and the number of 
clusters. 
Input: F 
Output: E 
Evaluate (F) 
C = Correlate(F) 
entropy = 0.0 
count = size(C) 
for i = 1 to count 
entropy += CalculateEntropy(C[i]) 
entropy = entropy / count 
E = [ count, entropy ] 
return E 
Figure 6.1. Evaluation function computing cluster count and average entropy 
The Evaluate function in figure 6.1 computes the number of clusters and the per-cluster 
entropy and returns an array of scalar values containing the results. The Correlate function is 
not shown for brevity, as it is dependent on implementation. The Correlate function used to 
generate results in section 6.4 implements the multi-paradigm alert correlation algorithm 
presented in chapter 5 to correlate Snort alerts. For the purposes of this chapter, the 
Correlate function returns a set of clusters, C, given a set of features, F. 
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The CalculateEntropy function is provided in appendix E and computes per-cluster 
entropy using five fields in the Snort alert schema: source and destination IP addresses, 
source and destination ports and signature name. 
6.3.2. Comparing feature sets 
To compare two feature sets, a Compare function is executed on the evaluation results 
obtained by calling the Evaluate function on the feature sets. There must be a weight value 
assigned to each evaluation criteria. Figure 6.2 shows the Compare function. 
Input: Ei, Ei, W 
Output: a scalar value; if output value >1 E^has better performance than E,; if output 
value <1 Ei has better performance than E2; if output value is 0.0 then the performance is 
equal 
Compare (E%, E2, W) 
sumE = 0.0 
for i = 1 to size(W) 
sumE += Ei [i] /E2 [i] * W[i] 
return sumE 
Figure 6.2. Generalized weighted comparison of evaluation results 
The function returns a scalar value where a value of 1.0 indicates no difference 
between the two feature sets. A value greater than 1.0 indicates the first set of evaluation 
results, Ei, does not perform as well as E2. A value less than 1.0 indicates that Ef s 
performance is better than that of E2 for the evaluation criteria. This then implies that if Ei is 
better than E2, then the feature set used to compute E/ is preferable to the feature set used to 
compute E2 according to evaluation criteria implemented in the Evaluate function. 
6.3.3. Feature selection 
In sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2, our evaluation and comparison functions were defined. 
These functions are used in the feature selection functions presented in this section. The 
functions ReverseFeatureSelect and ForwardFeatureSelect are run in succession by the 
FeatureSelect algorithm. The reverse and forward selection processes are hill-climbing 
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algorithms in that they only continue to run as long as the performance of feature selection 
improves. The ReverseFeatureSelect, ForwardFeatureSelect and FeatureSelect algorithms 
are presented in figures 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 respectively. 
In reverse feature selection, features are removed from the input feature set one-at-a-
time. If removing a feature provides equal or better performance, the algorithm is called 
recursively on the reduced feature set. This continues as long as performance improves or 
remains constant. When the algorithm completes, the feature set with the best performance is 
returned along with the performance improvement value and the evaluation results. 
Input: F, v, E, W 
Output. Fmin, Vmjn, Emm 
ReverseFeatureSelect (F, v, E, W) 
Fmin = F 
Vmin V 
Fmin — F 
for i = 1 to size(F) 
F' = F - F[i] 
E' = Evaluate(F') 
v = Compare(E', E, W) 
i f  ( V  < =  Vmin) 
F min f Vmin / Fmin — ReverseFeatureSelect (F', v, E', W) 
Vmin = Compare (Eminf E, W) // Recompute vmin 
return Fmin, vmin, Emin 
Figure 6.3. Reverse hill-climbing feature selection 
Forward feature selection is very similar to reverse feature selection, only features are 
added one-at-a-time from the Ftest feature set. Also, feature selection continues only if adding 
the feature improves performance, as adding additional features that do not improve the 
result only adds more complexity in the correlation process. 
The final algorithm, FeatureSelect, is our solution to feature selection for alert 
correlation. The algorithm begins by evaluating the candidate set of features, F, taken from a 
set of selected features defined by domain experts, Fau. Then reverse feature selection is 
performed on the candidate feature set, returning a potentially reduced set of features, F 
Forward feature selection is then performed on F ' by adding member of Faii that are not 
included in the candidate feature set. The final feature set is returned following forward 
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feature selection. The candidate feature set will be returned if reverse and forward feature 
selection cannot improve on the evaluation results of the candidate. 
Input: F, Ftest, v, E, W 
Output. F min, \ ' ri: - Emjn 
ForwardFeatureSelect (F, Ftest, v, E , W) 
Fmin = F 
>
 
II >
 
Fmin — E 
for i = 1 to size (Ftest) 
F' = F + Ftest [i] 
E ' = Evaluate(F ' ) 
v = Compare(E', E, W) 
if (V < Vmin) 
Fmin r Vmin / Fmin — 
ForwardFeatureSelect (F', Ftest — F test [ i ] f V, E ' , W) 
Vmin = Compare (Emin/ E, W) // Recompute vmin 
return Fmin, vmin, Emin 
Figure 6.4. Forward hill-climbing feature selection 
Input: F, Faii, W 
Output: F' 
FeatureSelect (F, Faj 1, W) 
E = Evaluate(F) 
F', v, E = ReverseFeatureSelect(F, 1, E, W) 
F', v, E = ForwardFeatureSelect(F', Fan - F, v, E, W) 
return F' 
Figure 6.5. Hill-climbing feature selection for multiple evaluation criteria 
6.4. Results 
This section presents feature selection results for alert correlation data generated over a 
six months time period between January 1, 2005 and June 30, 2005. For each Snort alert 
generated during this period, a network traffic profile of the internal host was generated and 
converted into a feature vector. The correlation process calculates the similarity of feature 
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vectors using Bray-Curtis distance and places alerts in clusters if the distance is less than a 
threshold value. In our experiments a value of 0.20 was used as our results in chapter 5 
showed this to be an acceptable threshold based on the number of clusters generated per day. 
We selected a threshold that was at the high end of our available resources in terms of cluster 
volume. By selecting a higher number of clusters, the per-cluster entropy was reduced, 
maximizing information value while at the same time presenting IDS alert information at a 
manageable rate. 
A set of features was generated using networking and intrusion detection domain 
knowledge. The set of features is shown in table 6.2 and described in detail in appendix D. 
From this group of features, a candidate set of features was selected. Also an expanded 
feature set and a reduced feature set were selected for comparison against the candidate 
feature set. 
Table 6.2. List of features included in each feature set used in testing 
Feature Set Name Features 
A Candidate srcip , dstip, srcport, dstport, duration, srcbytes, srcpkts, 
dstbytes, dstpkts, protocol, int-ext, res-eph 
B Expanded srcip , dstip, srcport, dstport, duration, srcbytes, srcpkts, 
dstbytes, dstpkts, protocol, int-ext, res-eph, hourofday 
C Reduced srcip, dstip, srcport, dstport, duration, protocol, byterate 
As described in section 6.3.1, we chose the number of clusters and the per-cluster 
entropy as the evaluation criteria for feature selection. The per-cluster entropy was computed 
as the sum of the entropy of five fields from the Snort alert schema (source and destination IP 
addresses, source and destination ports and signature name) divided by the number of 
clusters. 
As shown in table 6.3, the reduced feature set creates the fewest clusters but the per-
cluster entropy is very high. The expanded feature set, which only adds a single feature to the 
candidate, has lower entropy than the candidate feature set and a larger number of clusters. 
These factors must be weighed against each other when selecting feature sets prior to feature 
selection. Domain knowledge and experience are therefore important factors in this process. 
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Table 6.3. Results for cluster volume (CV) and per-cluster entropy (PCE) comparing initial feature 
sets (Candidate, Expanded, Reduced) to feature sets following feature selection (Candidate', 
Expanded', Reduced') 
Criteria Candidate Candidate' Expanded Expanded' Reduced Reduced' 
CV 461 499 665 706 273 270 
3.576 3.231 2.621 2.427 6.338 6.301 
The following sub-sections detail the results of applying our feature selection approach 
to the test feature sets. Sections 6.4.1, 6.4.2 and 6.4.3 provide results for the candidate feature 
set, the expanded feature set and the reduced feature set, respectively. 
Our performance metric is computed as the percentage performance of the initial 
feature set, with values over 100% indicating a performance penalty. Values less than 100% 
indicate that the net change in CV and PCE improved compared to the initial feature set. For 
this experiment, we used the strict criteria that only features that improve the entropy will be 
considered in the feature selection process. The tables that follow indicate performance 
results that did not improve the entropy with a value of "NI" instead of a percentage value 
indicating no improvement in entropy over the feature set being compared. 
6.4.1. Candidate feature set results 
The feature selection results for the candidate feature set (feature set A) are presented in 
tables 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 and figures 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8. Reverse feature selection begins by 
removing features one at a time from the candidate feature set as shown in table 6.2. Feature 
set A. 1 is the candidate feature set while features A.2 to A. 13 are the reduced feature sets. 
Performance is presented relative to feature set A. 1. 
As shown in table 6.4, removing the int-ext, protocol and srcport features all improved 
the correlation results as per the evaluation criteria with protocol being the best performing. 
As per the algorithm, ReverseFeatureSelect is called recursively on each of these reduced 
feature sets. Only results of following the protocol path through the algorithm are shown in 
this section, as this feature set ultimately leads to the best results. For completeness, the 
feature selection results for removing the int-ext and dstport features are presented in 
appendix F. 
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Table 6.4. Results from the first iteration of reverse feature selection where a single feature is 
removed from the candidate feature set 
Set # Feature Removed # Clusters Entropy Performance (%) 
A. 1 N/A 461 3.576 100.000 
A.2 res-eph 426 3.773 NI 
A.3 int-ext 475 3.443 99.330 
A.4 protocol 499 3.231 98.598 
A.5 dstpkts 455 3.700 NI 
A6 dstbytes 448 3.762 NI 
A. 7 srcpkts 450 3.801 NI 
A 8 srcbytes 459 3.675 NI 
duration 435 3.910 NI 
dstport 476 3.465 100.158 
A.11 srcport 488 3.325 98.841 
A 72 dstip 442 3.920 NI 
A73 srcip 335 4.135 NI 
Table 6.5. Results from the second round of reverse feature selection where a single feature is 
removed from feature set A.4; no feature set improved upon the results of feature set A.4 
Set # Features Removed # Clusters Entropy Performance (%) 
protocol 499 3.231 100.000 
A 74 protocol, res-eph 459 3.495 NI 
protocol, int-ext 529 3.037 100.619 
,4.76 protocol, dstpkts 487 3.486 NI 
A77 protocol, dstbytes 489 3.461 NI 
protocol, srcpkts 496 3.404 NI 
protocol, srcbytes 488 3.405 NI 
protocol, duration 475 3.568 NI 
A27 protocol, dstport 528 3.040 100.484 
A 22 protocol, srcport 536 2.988 100.657 
v4.2j protocol, dstip 486 3.497 NI 
,(.24 protocol, srcip 393 3.718 NI 
The second round of reverse feature selection is shown in table 6.5. No improvement 
could be made over the candidate feature set with the protocol feature removed. In our 
implementation, only feature sets that improve or maintain the correlation performance are 
considered during reverse feature selection so in this case reverse feature selection ends. 
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Several features are very insignificant in this case (int-ext, dstport and srcip). The algorithm 
can be modified to remove features outside a significance threshold. 
Forward feature selection, as shown in table 6.6, failed to improve upon the reduced 
feature set returned in the reverse feature selection process. The feature set returned is the 
candidate feature set with the protocol feature removed, yielding a modest 1.402% net 
performance gain. 
Table 6.6. Results from forward feature selection; the performance from feature set A.4 could not be 
improved 
Set # Feature Removed Feature Added # Clusters Entropy Performance (%) 
protocol N/A 499 3.231 100.000 
protocol hourofday 714 2.447 121.250 
^.26 protocol byterate 547 2.932 101.306 
A27 protocol logtypes 476 3.494 NI 
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6.4.2. Extended feature set results 
The feature selection results for the extended feature set are presented in tables 6.7, 6.8 
and 6.9 and figures 6.9, 6.10 and 6.11. For this feature set, the only improvement over the 
initial feature set is obtained by removing the int-ext feature during the first iteration of 
reverse feature selection. 
Table 6.7. Results from the first iteration of reverse feature selection where a single feature is 
removed from the extended feature set; feature set B.l is compared to feature sets B.2 to B.14 
Set# Feature Removed # Clusters Entropy Performance (%) 
B.l N/A 665 2.621 100.000 
a.2 hourofday 461 3.576 NI 
B.3 res-eph 633 2.826 NI 
a 4 int-ext 706 2.427 99.513 
B.5 protocol 714 2.447 101.389 
a 6 dstpkts 662 2.695 NI 
B.7 dstbytes 655 2.745 NI 
a. 8 srcpkts 661 2.669 NI 
a.p srcbytes 667 2.651 NI 
a. 70 duration 651 2.737 NI 
B.ll dstport 694 2.539 101.547 
a. 72 srcport 705 2.472 100.888 
dstip 667 2.685 NI 
a M srcip 562 3.101 NI 
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Table 6.8. Results from the second round of reverse feature selection where a single feature is 
removed from feature set B.4; no feature set improved upon the results of feature set B.4 
Set # Features Removed # Clusters Entropy Performance (%) 
B.4 int-ext 706 2.427 100.000 
a.yj int-ext, hourofday 475 3.443 NI 
a M int-ext, res-eph 673 2.633 NI 
a;/ int-ext, protocol 748 2.308 101.534 
a 78 int-ext, dstpkts 717 2.419 101.235 
a;p int-ext, dstbytes 711 2.454 NI 
a.20 int-ext, srcpkts 721 2.421 101.903 
a. 27 int-ext, srcbytes 711 2.444 NI 
a.22 int-ext, duration 690 2.535 NI 
a.2J int-ext, dstport 741 2.337 101.626 
a. 24 int-ext, srcport 737 2.319 100.368 
a.2j int-ext, dstip 713 2.472 NI 
a.26 int-ext, srcip 573 3.055 NI 
Table 6.9. Results from forward feature selection; the performance from feature set B.4 could not be 
improved as adding either feature did not lower the entropy 
Set # Feature Removed Feature Added # Clusters Entropy Performance (%) 
a.4 int-ext N/A 706 2.427 100.000 
a.27 int-ext byterate 530 3.055 NI 
a.2<s int-ext logtypes 464 3.616 NI 
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not decrease the per-cluster entropy and therefore did not have a computed performance value 
6.4.3. Reduced feature set results 
The reduced feature set feature selection results are presented in tables 6.10, 6.11 and 
6.12 and figures 6.12, 6.13 and 6.14. For this feature set, the only improvement over the 
initial feature set is obtained by removing the dstport feature during the first iteration of 
reverse feature selection. Interestingly, CV and PCE are improved by removing this feature. 
There are three fewer clusters (270 compared to 273) and the entropy decreased by 0.037 
bits. Although not large improvements, this shows that the feature can be removed to reduce 
the number of features and improve correlation performance for both evaluation criteria. 
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Table 6.10. Results from the first iteration of reverse feature selection where a single feature is 
removed from the reduced feature set 
Set# Feature Removed # Clusters Entropy Performance (%) 
C.l N/A 273 6.338 100.000 
C.2 byterate 331 5.442 108.514 
C.3 protocol 302 6.052 106.553 
C.4 duration 229 7.409 NI 
C.5 dstport 270 6.301 98.363 
C.6 srcport 285 6.269 103.415 
0.7 dstip 242 7.212 NI 
C.8 Srcip 153 8.740 NI 
Table 6.11. Results from the second round of reverse feature selection where a single feature is 
removed from feature set C.5; no feature set improved upon the results of feature set C.5 
Set # Features Removed # Clusters Entropy Performance (%) 
C.5 dstport 270 6.301 100.000 
CP dstport, byterate 344 5.213 111.867 
C.70 dstport, protocol 306 7.454 106.870 
C.ll dstport, duration 220 6.180 NI 
C.A2 dstport, srcport 285 7.362 103.830 
CJj dstport, dstip 236 7.362 NI 
C.74 dstport, srcip 138 8.867 NI 
Table 6.12. Results from forward feature selection; the performance from feature set C.5 could not be 
improved 
Set # Feature Removed Feature Added # Clusters Entropy Performance (%) 
C.J dstport N/A 270 6.301 100.00 
C.7J dstport hourofday 513 3.973 156.750 
C.M dstport logtypes 268 6.513 NI 
C.77 dstport res-eph 304 5.832 105.903 
C.78 dstport int-ext 258 6.753 NI 
C.7P dstport dstpkts 336 5.188 108.553 
C.20 dstport dstbytes 452 3.596 128.779 
C.27 dstport srcpkts 333 5.257 108.427 
C.22 dstport srcbytes 370 4.809 115.733 
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6.5. Summary 
Ideally, feature selection for alert correlation uses labeled data to optimize a set of 
features by considering all possible feature combinations. This is unrealistic in production 
environments where labeled datasets of significant size are rarely available and the number 
of possible feature combinations is extremely large. 
Our approach to feature selection allows feature sets to be compared on any number of 
weighted evaluation criteria, making feature selection possible on unlabeled datasets. Also, 
we use hill-climbing approaches to reverse and forward feature selection that locally 
optimize a candidate feature set based on the user-defined evaluation criteria. These two 
contributions make our approach ideal for production environments where labeled data is 
unavailable and feature selection must be run periodically on live data to tune alert 
correlation algorithms. 
We have implemented our feature selection algorithm and applied it to our multi-
paradigm alert correlation feature set. The results show that the performance of our candidate 
feature set can be improved by removing a single feature in terms of PCE and CV. 
Additionally, we test our implementation on alternate feature sets to show the feature 
selection process on reduced and expanded feature sets. 
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7. Conclusions and Future Work 
7.1. Discussion 
This dissertation addresses techniques useful for adapting IDS research to large-scale 
production networks. The end goal of our work is a new approach to alert correlation that is 
IDS independent. This is an important contribution, as current techniques require 
normalization and expert rules to perform correlation, which is difficult in practice. Our alert 
correlation approach is designed for multi-sensor environments where the number of alerts 
generated by IDSs outpaces the analysts' ability to evaluate alerts. 
The correlation algorithm can be tuned on live datasets using our domain expert 
evaluation approach along with our hill climbing feature selection algorithm. This is an 
important aspect of our work, as current alert correlation techniques do not provide 
approaches or suggestions on how to tune alert correlation algorithms on production 
networks where labeled datasets are unavailable. Without the ability to tune and test 
correlation performance, alert correlation cannot be adequately integrated into the real-world 
toolset used by security analysts to perform their job duties. This evaluation approach can be 
applied to other alert correlation techniques besides our prototype system. 
Our prototype alert correlation system is built upon a foundation of important tools: the 
data management and access framework and the alert verification and event correlation 
framework. The data management and access framework provides scalable data capture and 
a single view of the data via a web service. The alert verification and event correlation 
framework provides the ability to verify alerts and gather correlated events via software 
agents. Both frameworks are IDS and data independent and are easily adapted to a variety of 
network environments. 
While these frameworks provide the foundation for building the alert correlation 
prototype, they address limitations of many research efforts in IDSs and can be extended to 
provide scalable data capture and access and automate repetitive tasks to fill a variety of IDS 
needs. Until now, generalized approaches to the areas addressed by each framework have not 
been designed for IDS research. Our work addresses this limitation and can be used by IDS 
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researchers to make their work more practical and applicable to production network 
environments. 
7.2. Conclusions 
This dissertation has presented a variety of solutions to problems facing the application 
of IDS research to large, production networks. The contributions of this work are important 
to developers and researchers in this area as the techniques developed here allow IDS 
research results to be deployed and tested in practice and used to provide security analysts 
with tools to better perform their jobs. 
We first addressed limitation in scalability and usability inherent in managing and 
accessing large, heterogeneous datasets typically used in network security. We have 
presented a web service framework and implementation that provides uniform access to 
multi-terabyte datasets with minimal overhead. This system is currently deployed at LANL 
and provides analysts with access to billions of records from a variety of tools over a span of 
five years. 
Next, we developed and implemented a framework for alert verification and event 
correlation. By using an agent-based approach, our system can be easily extended to perform 
a variety of functions, of which we presented several example agent implementations. 
Building upon our alert verification and event correlation framework, we developed an 
IDS independent, multi-paradigm alert correlation algorithm. Our results were obtained from 
six months of network data generated at LANL. Domain expert security analysts evaluated 
our results, showing how alert correlation algorithms can be tested and tuned in real-world 
environments. Overall, our method of correlation was preferred to a technique correlating 
alerts using features in the Snort alert schema. 
Finally, we developed a feature selection algorithm designed to run on production 
datasets to tune alert correlation results using user-defined performance metrics. We defined 
two metrics for performing feature selection on our alert correlation results: cluster entropy 
and cluster volume. Using the tradeoff in performance between the two measures we were 
able to reduce our feature set, improving performance in terms of the performance metrics 
and execution time. 
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As we have provided solutions to problems common to many IDSs, we feel that the 
existing body of research in this area can be more easily adapted for use in practice. Our hope 
is that both research, open source and commercial IDS developers will apply and expand 
upon the ideas and solutions presented in this dissertation to create a new class of scalable, 
flexible and accurate IDS suitable for deployment in large, production networks. 
7.3. Future Work 
To continue our work in extending intrusion detection research to production 
environments we hope to continue development of each of the four areas we have addressed 
in this dissertation: data management and access, alert information quality, alert correlation 
and performance evaluation. Specifics for each area are provided in the following 
subsections. Section 7.3.1 addresses our future work in web services and global-scale 
intrusion detection. Section 7.3.2 describes future development that we will explore to extend 
the alert verification and event correlation framework. Section 7.3.3 discusses our plan to 
improve upon multi-paradigm alert correlation. Section 7.3.4 concludes by addressing our 
plans to extend the feature selection and performance evaluation techniques that we have 
developed. 
7.3.1. Data management and access 
The results of the web service prototype have been encouraging and we hope to build 
on top of the web service by exploring the advantages of multi-site data sharing. With the 
system in place, it is now possible to explore emerging research areas including correlation 
of network events and detection of widely distributed network attacks. The growing number 
of XML data processing tools can now be applied to network security data sources. We hope 
to explore emerging XML technologies such as XSLT, XPath and XQuery to assist in 
knowledge acquisition, data mining and user interface development. 
Future revisions of DISARM's web service will be designed and implemented using 
web service standards such as SOAP, WSDL and UDDI. This will reduce the burden on 
developers and also allow for greater extensibility of the web service's functionality. As the 
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system is largely XML-based already, extending the model to incorporate web service 
standards will not be difficult. Also, current research such as Extended Service Oriented 
Architecture (ESOA) aims to address the problems of distributing web services between 
multiple sites [4], This technology can be integrated into the web service framework to make 
multi-site data sharing easier to deploy for organizations like the United States' Department 
of Energy (DOE) or Department of Defense (DOD). 
Also, privacy issues must be explored to motivate sites to deploy this web service. The 
sensitivity of network security data is an important issue and cannot be ignored. It is unlikely 
that sites will allow universal access to their data. Thus the system must provide mechanisms 
for protecting data. The access controls and authentication integrated into the system are a 
solid foundation but additional functionality such as integrated data obfuscation need to be 
explored. 
7.3.2. Alert verification and event correlation 
In continuing this research, we plan to focus on the development of novel alert 
verification agents. Also we would like to implement more complex agent dependencies to 
improve upon the hierarchical processing capabilities of the prototype system. 
Finally we hope to make agent development easier by automating various aspects of 
creating and adding agents to the framework. This will involve moving from an HTTP based 
implementation to one using web service technology as we plan to do with the web service 
framework. Adopting web service standards in these two areas will be examined 
simultaneously. 
7.3.3. Alert correlation 
To improve upon our alert correlation results we plan to apply more advanced data 
mining techniques to our correlation model. The similarity measure and clustering algorithm 
are the two areas in which our results can be improved by using novel data mining 
techniques. Also, as new input datasets become available we will explore the impact of the 
data on the correlation process. Most importantly, we will begin extending the correlation 
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algorithm to incorporate additional alert datasets beyond Snort. We plan to show that our 
technique is applicable to IPS and ADS alerts as well as misuse detection systems. 
As our current prototype implementation is an off-line post-processing system, we plan 
to implement a new real-time, online system based on the prior implementation. This will 
involve creating real-time event correlation agents to assist in the collection of log data for 
alert profile generation. Also, the clustering algorithm needs to be rewritten to provide the 
ability to add alerts to clusters without rebuilding the entire dataset. 
7.3.4. Feature selection and performance evaluation 
We plan to expand the number of evaluation criteria and determine additional 
candidate feature sets. Also we hope to explore randomized versions of our feature selection 
algorithm to evaluate feature sets that were not considered in our current implementation. 
Tuning of our correlation results will require additional domain expert evaluations, 
which require a large time commitment from the analysts. We hope to examine means of 
streamlining this process to optimize the effectiveness of the evaluation while making the 
process easier on the analysts. One approach is to develop user feedback capabilities in the 
software prototypes to allow analysts to evaluate results during their daily operations. 
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APPENDIX A. Query Document Type Definition 
This appendix presents the generalized query schema discussed in chapter 3. To extend 
the query schema, additional attributes can be added to the Query element. The attributes 
shown in italic, srcip, dstip and dstport, are currently supported by the LANL 
implementation. Additional fields such as MAC address or source port can be added to the 
schema to fit the needs of the site deploying the web service. 
<?xml version-'1.0"?> 
<!ELEMENT Query (Query*, Timestamp*, DataType*, SearchField*)> 
<!ELEMENT Timestamp EMPTY> 
<! ELEMENT Datatype EMPTY> 
<! ELEMENT Search Field EMPTY> 
</v47TL/5T gwery src/p CTW7W> 
<!ATTLIST Query dstip CDATA> 
<!ATTLIST Query dstport CDATA> 
<!ATTLIST Query user CDATA> 
<!ATTLIST Query password CDATA> 
<!ATTLIST Timestamp start CDATA #REQUIRED > 
<!ATTLIST Timestamp end CDATA> 
<!ATTLIST Search Field name CDATA #REQUIRED> 
<!ATTLIST SearchField format CDATA> 
<!ATTLIST SearchField predicate (=|%gt;|%lt;|%gt;=|%lt;=|~) #REQUIRED> 
<!ATTLIST SearchField value CDATA> 
<!ATTLIST SearchField lower CDATA> 
<! ATTLIST SearchField upper CDATA> 
<!ATTLIST DataType type CDATA #REQUIRED> 
<!ATTLIST DataType sensor CDATA> 
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APPENDIX B. Result Document Type Definition 
The generalized result schema discussed in chapter 3 is presented in this appendix. To 
extend this schema, elements are added to the QueryResult element, which will contain 
entries for each data type being made available to query via the web service. As an example, 
the XML DTD additions for LANL's LFAP data type are included and shown in italics. 
LFAP data records are unidirectional flow records generated by cflowd, a network 
connection generation process running on LANL's internal routers. 
<?xml version-'1.0"?> 
<!ELEMENT Result (QueryError*, QueryResult*, DataType*)> 
<!ELEMENT Query Error EMPTY> 
<!ELEMENT QueryResult (LFAP*, typei*, type2*, ... , typen*)> 
<! ELEMENT DataType (Sensor+, SearchField+)> 
<! ELEMENT Sensor EMPTY> 
<! ELEMENT SearchField (Predicate+, Format+)> 
<!ELEMENT Predicate (EMPTY)> 
<! ELEMENT Format (EMPTY)> 
<!ELEMENT LFAP (EMPTY)> 
<! ATTLIST Result incident CDATA> 
<!ATTLIST DataType id CDATA #REQUIRED > 
<!ATTLIST DataType name CDATA> 
<! ATTLIST Sensor id CDATA #REQUIRED > 
<! ATTLIST Sensor name CDATA> 
<! ATTLIST SearchField name CDATA #REQUIRED > 
<! ATTLIST SearchField description CDATA #REQUIRED > 
<!ATTLIST Predicate value (=|%gt;|%lt;|%gt;=|%lt;=|~) #REQUIRED> 
<!ATTLIST Format name CDATA #REQUIRED> 
<!ATTLIST Format description CDATA> 
<!ATTLIST Format default CDATA> 
<! ATTLIST LFAP sensor CDATA #REQUIRED> 
<!ATTLIST LFAP srcip CDATA #REQUIRED> 
<! ATTLIST LFAP srcport CDATA #REQUIRED> 
<! ATTLIST LFAP dstip CDATA #REQUIRED> 
<!ATTLIST LFAP dstport CDATA #REQUIRED> 
<!ATTLIST LFAP bytes CDATA #REQUIRED> 
<! ATTLIST LFAP pkts CDATA #REQUIRED> 
<!ATTLIST LFAP startts CDATA #REQUIRED> 
<!ATTLIST LFAP endts CDATA #REQUIRED> 
<! ATTLIST LFAP protocol CDATA #REQUIRED> 
<! ATTLIST LFAP router CDATA #REQUIRED> 
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APPENDIX C. Alert Database Relation Schémas 
This appendix details the relations used in our prototype alert verification and event 
correlation framework implementation presented in chapter 4. Table C.l shows the relations, 
their schémas and a brief description. Section 4.3 provides additional detail on the usage of 
these relations in the prototype. The schémas for the type-specific alert relations are omitted. 
Three such relations are used in our prototype, one for each of the supported IDSs: Snort, 
TippingPoint and EMAAD. 
Table C.l. List of relations used in framework implementation. 
Relation Schema Description 
alert state < Alert ID, Agent ID, Evaluation, Mapping of alert state and evaluation to 
State > agents 
universal alert < Alert ID, Agent ID, Timestamp > Primaiy table for storing alert 
information 
< Alert ID, fields for IDS alert... > Per-IDS table for IDS-specific fields 
alert 
< Dependent Agent ID, Parent Agent Mapping of agent dependencies 
ID, Dependency > 
information < Alert ID, Agent ID, content > Free-text information content from 
content evaluation agent 
< Alert ID, Agent ID, event > Correlated events from event correlation 
events agent stored as XML 
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APPENDIX D. Feature Vector 
Table D. 1 described the feature vector schema used in the evaluation of our multi-
paradigm alert correlation algorithm in chapter 5. Selecting features and histogram ranges is 
a highly subjective process that is dependent on domain knowledge. Most features described 
are taken directly from fields in network traffic and intrusion detection log records. The 
Network Relation and Port Relation features are abstract features. 
Table D.l. Feature vector abbreviations and histogram range descriptions 
Field Abbreviation Histogram Values Description 
Source IP srcip [0 ... 255 ] the class A network of the IP 
Destination IP dstip [0 ...255 ] the class A network of the IP 
Source Port srcport [ X , Y ]  X< 1024, Y>= 1024 
Destination Port dstport [ % , Y ]  X< 1024, Y >=1024 
Duration duration [ 0 ... 9 ] non-linear range of integer values 
Source Bytes srcbytes [ 0 ... 9 ] non-linear range of integer values 
Source Packets srcpkts [ 0 ... 9 ] non-linear range of integer values 
Dest. Bytes dstbytes [ 0 - 9 ]  non-linear range of integer values 
Dest. Packets dstpkts [ 0 - 9 ]  non-linear range of integer values 
Protocol protocol [ TCP, UDP, ICMP ] 
Network Relation int-ext [ X-Z,Y^Z, X and Y are internal networks, 
Z^X,Z^Y ] Z is all external networks 
Port Relation res-eph 
X
 î 
>
 
>
 
î X X< 1024, Y>= 1024 
X^X,Y-»Y ] 
The Source IP and Destination IP address features are divided into 256 bins each and the 
bin value is incremented according to the upper eight bits of the IP address. The Source Port 
and Destination Port features are divided into two bins each, one for reserved ports under 
1024 and the other for ephemeral ports 1024 and above. The Duration, packet and byte 
features are divided into bins according to the ranges in table D.2. The bin count is only 
incremented for the first bin the matches the record's value for that field. The Protocol 
feature defines bins for TCP, UDP and ICMP and increments the count for each record 
according to its protocol. The Network Relation feature tracks the relationship between the 
source IP and the destination IP in the record. Internal networks are defined as X and Y with 
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Z being all external networks. For example if the source IP of a record is in Y and the 
destination address is in Z then the bin for Y-»Z is incremented. The Port Relation feature is 
similar to the Network Relation feature, tracking the relation between source and destination 
port. For example, the X-»X bin is incremented when a record contains reserved ports for 
both the source and destination ports. 
Table D.2. Miscellaneous histogram ranges 
Feature Category Ranges 
Duration (sec) 0, 1-5, 6-10, 11-60, 61-120, 121-300, 301-600, 601-
1200,1201-1800,1801+ 
(100s bytes) 0-1,2-10, 11-50,51-100, 101-500,501-1000, 1001-
5000, 5001-10000,10001-50000, 50001+ 
Source Packets 0-3, 4-7, 8-15, 16-30, 31-50, 51-100, 101-500, 501 -
1000, 1001-5000, 5001 + 
Destination Bytes (100s bytes) 0-1,2-10, 11-50, 51-100, 101-500, 501-1000, 1001 -
5000,5001-10000, 10001-50000, 50001 + 
Destination Packets 0-3, 4-7, 8-15, 16-30, 31-50, 51-100, 101-500, 501-
1000, 1001-5000, 5001+ 
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APPENDIX E. Entropy Calculations 
N / M, \ 
entropy(c) = ^ -1 * ^ pjlog ipj 
,=1 \ ./=1 
(E.1) 
Equation E. 1 calculates the entropy in bits for a cluster of Snort alerts c where N is the 
number of features. Mi is the number of distinct items for feature i and pj is the probability 
that the/h value of feature i is found in cluster C. For each cluster of Snort alerts, entropy is 
calculated and summed for five features: source and destination IP addresses, source and 
destination ports, and signature name. The function shown in figure E.l is used to compute 
the average entropy for a set of clusters. 
Input: C - a set of clusters of Snort alerts 
Output: per-cluster entropy of C in bits 
CalculateEntropy (C) 
e = 0.0 
count = size(C) 
for i = 1 to count 
e += entropy (C[i]) 
e = e / count 
return e 
Figure E.l. CalculateEntropy function used in prototype feature selection algorithm 
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APPENDIX F. Additional Candidate Feature Selection Results 
This appendix presents additional results from the candidate feature selection process 
in chapter 6. Table 6.4 in section 6.4.1 shows that removing three features individually (int-
ext, protocol and srcporf) from the candidate feature set results in improved performance. 
The algorithm is recursive and runs reverse feature selection on each of these three feature 
sets. Section 6.4.1 only presents results from the protocol execution path, which ultimately 
results in the best performance of the three paths. For completeness, we show the second 
round of reverse feature selection for the int-ext and srcport paths. As shown in tables F.l 
and F.2, neither of the feature sets can be further reduced, thus showing that feature set A. 4 is 
the optimal feature set in this case. 
Table F.l. Results from the second iteration of reverse feature selection where the int-ext feature has 
been removed from the candidate feature set; feature set A.3 is compared to feature sets A.28 to A. 38 
Set# Features Removed # Clusters Entropy Performance (%) 
A.3 int-ext 475 3.443 100.000 
int-ext, res-eph 443 3.590 NI 
A 29 int-ext, protocol 529 3.037 101.198 
int-ext, dstpkts 479 3.538 102.962 
int-ext, dstbytes 476 3.617 NI 
int-ext, srcpkts 489 3.498 104.131 
int-ext, srcbytes 470 3.559 101.534 
int-ext, duration 467 3.536 100.305 
int-ext, dstport 512 3.206 101.760 
int-ext, srcport 527 3.100 102.345 
/U7 int-ext, dstip 462 3.757 NI 
/U8 int-ext, srcip 368 3.956 NI 
118 
Table F.2. Results from the second iteration of reverse feature selection where the srcport feature is 
removed from the candidate feature set; feature set A.ll is compared to feature sets A.39 to A.49 
Set # Features Removed # Clusters Entropy Performance (%) 
A.11 srcport 488 3.325 100.000 
v4.JP srcport, res-eph 445 3.644 NI 
srcport, int-ext 527 3.100 102.345 
A 47 srcport, protocol 536 2.988 101.483 
srcport, dstpkts 477 3.489 101.291 
/Wj srcport, dstbytes 481 3.524 103.049 
srcport, srcpkts 483 3.427 101.031 
A 4 J srcport, srcbytes 475 3.556 102.542 
A 46 srcport, duration 469 3.561 101.370 
yf.47 srcport, dstport 511 3.185 101.009 
srcport, dstip 476 3.582 NI 
,4.49 srcport, srcip 378 3.867 -
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